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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Responsible arms control is an effective tool in international efforts to make sure that arms 
do not reach pariah states and terrorist groups.  It must be balanced against the need to 
have a conducive environment for the defence industry to flourish. Unfortunately arms 
control has been suggested to be limiting the flow of business in the defence industry by 
delaying the acquisition of defence matériel due to the processes of acquiring permits, 
reduced revenues as more resource allocation for the arms control role and loss of 
business due to the limited pool of customers arising from embargoes. It was therefore the 
aim of this study to investigate the factors that are considered to affect the effectiveness of 
arms control at Armscor and its contractors with a view to identifying gaps and come up 
with ways to address those gaps. This it is hoped will help Armscor to improve its arms 
control system and thus strengthen its position as the acquisition arm of the South African 
National Defence Force (SANDF).  
 
The objectives of the study were to: 
• review the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) policies and 
regulations with a view to identifying problematic areas and ways to address them. 
• determine the values of the defence matériel acquired for the SANDF through 
Armscor in the last three years to establish the potential loss of business if Armscor 
could be blacklisted due to violation of arms control regulations of supplier 
countries. 
• determine the effectiveness of the leadership of Armscor Project managers and the 
arms control awareness programmes. 
• establish the strengths and weaknesses of the role players in the South African 
arms control environment  
 
The   NCACC policies and regulation were reviewed by establishing from literature the 
common violations and investigate how these are addressed in the regulations. The 
potential loss of business at Armscor was established by obtaining data from the 
Directorate Conventional Arms Control (DCAC) on import permits issued to Armscor from 
2007 to 2009 and their monetary value was determined and this was taken as the potential 
loss of business. The effectiveness of the leadership of the Armscor Program managers 
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and the awareness programs were determined through questionnaires and analysis of 
audit reports respectively. The strengths and weaknesses of the role players in arms 
control were determined by interviewing the senior people in the Armscor Arms Control 
Division (ACD), DCAC, SANDF, Armscor Business Logistics (Armscor shipping agent) and 
customs.  
 
It was found from literature that the common violations are related to the procurement of 
non-substantial military items and Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). Interviews with 
some of the role-players revealed that industry is concerned about delays in procurement 
due to longer turnaround times in applications and issuing of EUC and permits. The 
procurement of arms is adequately addressed in the regulations under munitions list but 
there is a problem with classification of dual-use items. There is also lack of appropriate 
control of arms brokers and even though the NCACC regulations provide for the issuing of 
open permits which could be used to avoid delays in permit application for very urgent 
cases, the DCAC is reluctant to apply this clause. The total value of import permits that 
were issued to Armscor from 2007 to 2009 is R3.778 billion, R4.889 billion, R4.505 billion 
respectively and these were taken as potential loss of business to Armscor should it be 
blacklisted.  The responses from the questionnaire indicated that Armscor Project 
Managers use a leadership style that is conducive to arms control implementation as they 
act as liaison with the external constituencies, trouble-shooters, coaches and conflict 
managers. Although no findings were reported from audits, there were gaps that were 
identified which imply that the awareness is not at the optimum level. The interviews 
revealed that some of the role-players do not have appropriate resources (human, funds, IT 
systems) and as such would adversely affect the work of other role players in the 
procurement chain.  
 
It is believed that a good arms control framework must start at a higher level with effective 
functioning of the controlling body, DCAC, and it cascades down to industry which includes 
Armscor. Thus it is believed that DCAC could function better if it becomes a separate entity 
that has its own budget and therefore can be able to address its human resource and other 
problems. The role-players must work closely together and forums be initiated where there 
will be regular engagement on identified problems. Armscor positions itself to play a role as 
a knowledge base of the arms control industry as it is the only company in industry that has 
a well developed arms control system and has vast experience in the field.  
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DEFINITIONS 
 
Acquisition  - refers to all the activities needed to satisfy the requirements for a 
qualified defence matériel and starts from the identification of requirements up to 
commissioning. 
 
Arms control  - refers to the control of activities relating to the marketing, import, export, 
transit, re-export, re-import or manufacturing of armaments and related technical data, 
technologies, equipment and services, in terms of South African defence trade legislation, 
international arms control and non-proliferation agreements to which South Africa has 
committed itself, relevant legislation of trade partner countries, and bilateral defence trade 
agreements between Armscor and external entities 
 
Conventional arms - refers to weapons, munitions, explosives, bombs, armaments, 
vessels, vehicles, aircraft designed or manufactured for use in war, and any other articles 
of war and also any component, equipment, system, processes and technology of whatever 
nature capable of being used in the design, development, manufacture, upgrading of items 
mentioned earlier and dual-use goods. 
 
Defence matériel - refers to armaments and related technical data, technologies, 
equipment, services and dual use goods. 
 
Dual-use items - refers to goods and technologies which have civilian applications but 
could also be used for the production of arms or other military purposes. 
 
End-User Certificate – is a written undertaking provided by the end-user that the 
conventional arms will neither be transferred/re-exported, nor allowed to be transferred/re-
exported to any other foreign party or country without the prior written consent of the 
Supplier or its Government.   
 
K225 - Inspection or Acceptance Release Certificate which confirms that the output 
complies with the applicable order requirements. 
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Procurement - is the process whereby a mutually beneficial contract is brought about, 
carried out and completed. It is a narrower concept that acquisition. Procurement supports 
acquisition. 
 
Regulations - refers to the regulations to the National Conventional Arms Control Act, Act 
41 of 2002 as contained in the Government Gazette of South Africa Volume 467 No 7969 
published in Pretoria on 28 May 2004. 
 
Supplier Country - refers to country or countries of manufacture of controlled defence 
matériel and or country from which such controlled defence material is exported to South 
Africa. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ACD   - Armscor Arms Control Division 
AOG  - Aircraft on the ground 
APM  - Armscor Project Manager  
Armscor   - Armaments Corporation of South Africa 
COCOM  -  Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls 
DACO  - Designated Arms Control Official 
DOD  - Department of Defence 
DTI  - Department of Trade and Industry 
DCAC  - Directorate Conventional Arms Control Committee 
ECO  - Export Control Organisation (UK) 
EUC  - End-user certificate 
EUU  - End-User Undertaking 
EIPA  - Export and Import Permits Act (Canada) 
GDP  - Gross Domestic Product 
HMRC  - Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (UK) 
ITAR  - International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
MTCR  - Missile Technology Control Regime 
NCACC  - National Conventional Arms Control Committee 
NPC  - Non-Proliferation Council (The South African Council for the Non- 
                                      Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction) 
NSG  - Nuclear Suppliers Group 
NTP  - Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
SANDF  - South African National Defence Force 
UN  - United Nations 
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CHAPTER 1 
        PROBLEM IN CONTEXT, PROBLEM STATEMENT AND OBJECTIVES 
1.1 Introduction  
 
The establishment of a democratic government in South Africa opened the world markets 
for defence equipment, when the United Nations arms embargo was lifted in 1994. 
However, a prerequisite for South Africa to be recognised as a trustworthy defence trade 
partner was to subscribe to and participate in international arms control and non-
proliferation activities aimed at the promotion of international peace and stability. South 
Africa thus became member of a number of international treaties, agreements and 
arrangements which demanded implementation of a national arms control and non-
proliferation system. After the termination of its nuclear weapons programme and its space 
programme, South Africa acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NTP), and was 
invited to join international initiatives like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 
and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) working towards the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons as well as delivery systems for such weapons. South Africa is also signatory to 
the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. These 
international commitments led to the implementation of the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Act, Act No 83 of 1993 and national authorities administering this Act.  
 
In terms of the Armaments Development and Production Act, Act No 57 of 1968, the 
Minister of Defence was responsible for the control of the import and export of arms, a 
responsibility he delegated to Armscor. Up to 1992 Armscor was responsible both for the 
acquisition and manufacture of armaments for the then South African Defence Force. In 
1992 Denel was formed, taking over the manufacturing function, while Armaments 
Corporation of South Africa (Armscor) concentrated on the acquisition function, as well as 
the disposal of redundant SANDF equipment. This function was under severe pressure to 
generate income for the government, which led to questionable transactions, which 
resulted in an enquiry by the Cameron Commission in 1994. One of the findings of the 
Cameron Commission was that Armscor could not be responsible for the issuing of export 
permits while it was also a player in the field of arms trade. It was decided that the control 
function should be transferred to the Defence Secretariat. This move gradually led to the 
formation of the conventional arms control structure, the National Conventional Arms 
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Control Committee (NCACC), as described in the National Conventional Arms Control Act, 
Act No 41 of 2002. 
 
In order to pave the way to also become a member of the dominant international 
conventional arms control organisation, the Wassenaar Agreement (WA), the control lists of 
the WA were published as Regulations under the National Conventional Arms Control Act 
in 2004. In May 2005 South Africa was allowed to become a Participating State of the WA. 
 
1.2 Problem in Context 
 
Armscor is the designated acquisition agency of the Department of Defence (DOD) and is 
responsible for professional programme management and the drafting of tender 
documentation for the contracting of industry on behalf of the DOD during the execution of 
armament acquisition programmes.  It ensures that the technical, financial and legal 
integrity in contract management is in accordance with DOD requirements.   
 
In fulfilling its function, Armscor is involved in the import and export of defence matériel 
subject to control measures prescribed by the South African arms control and non-
proliferation system described above. Although one should bear in mind that the non-
proliferation control system forms an intricate part of the South African arms control and 
non-proliferation system, this project will concentrate only on the arms control part, as 
Armscor is only involved in the transfer of conventional arms. The national policy, as 
formulated in the Non-Proliferation Act prohibits any involvement in the development or use 
of weapons of mass destruction.     
 
Due to the nature of these Armscor’s activities there are tight delivery dates that must be 
adhered to with possible penalties for non-adherence.  It is important that these must be 
executed in compliance with arms control requirements so that Armscor continues to be 
internationally recognized as a responsible and trustworthy trade partner and thus be able 
to optimally satisfy the needs of the SANDF and other clients regarding defence equipment.  
 
The Armaments Development and Production Act, Act No 57 of 1968 referred to earlier 
was repealed and replaced by the Armaments Corporation of South Africa, Limited Act, Act 
No. 51 of 2003.  
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In terms of this Act, Armscor is responsible to establish a compliance system ensuring that 
the DOD complies with relevant arms control and non-proliferation legislation. In practice 
this means that Armscor is responsible for arms control compliance during the acquisition 
and disposal phases of defence equipment, and will assist the DOD to implement the 
necessary control measures during the operational phase. 
 
The process for the procurement of controlled items can be generally represented as 
follows: 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The process of procurement of non-controlled items would not require import/export 
permits or end-user certificates (EUCs) and hence will not go through ACD, the DCAC and 
may not be subjected to arms export controls of the supplier and hence delivery times are 
drastically reduced. It must be mentioned that the national arms control systems of supplier 
countries differ from each other and from South Africa. For example in Germany all items 
are controlled, whether controlled in terms of the WA control lists or not, in cases where it is 
2. Process for 
procurement initiated by 
the Project Manager   
3. Supplier country 
receives order and 
process subject to 
export controls of 
that country   
4. Submission to 
ACD for facilitation 
of process to apply 
for EUCs/permits 
(Import/Export) 
5. Submission of  
application to DCAC 
for assessment. 
NCACC makes 
decision on certain 
applications 
6. Shipping (air/sea) 
to end-user  
7. Customs 
clearance 
8. Project Manager receives 
the equipment/Payment by 
Armscor and submission of 
Arms Control Declaration  
1. Need Identified by the 
SANDF   
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intended for military use. This may cause problems, for example, if South Africa is forced to 
issue an EUC signed by the SA government for unlisted items as the South African 
authorities will have to issue import permits contrary to its legislation for uncontrolled items.   
 
The Armscor Project Manager (APM) is the starting point in a successful procurement of 
defence matèriel for the SANDF and careful and responsible consideration of arms control 
requirements in the early project planning stages is crucial. There is evidence that arms 
control practice has not been fully embraced by the project managers and is sometimes 
viewed as just an unnecessary add-on to the huge paper work that is involved in project 
management. Recently the General Manager of Quality and IT, the department under 
which the ACD falls, was dismayed at the attitude displayed by the project manager of one 
of the cardinal programmes with regard to the control of non-substantial military like nuts 
and bolts. “The attitude of the Project Managers needs to be changed” he remarked. The 
fact that there was eagerness to ignore the arms control requirements rather than finding a 
responsible way around the problem of work overload due to the control of these small 
items highlighted a deeper problem.  Probably the project managers may not be aware of 
the possibility of huge penalties for non-adherence or the ultimate penalty of being denied 
trade in arms with that country which would render Armscor redundant. For some Project 
Managers they do not see adherence to arms control practice in their projects as their 
responsibility, they will not be held accountable for any non-adherence even though the 
arms control practice emphasizes so.  This could highlight the need for regular arms control 
audits at Armscor and its contractors to monitor arms control compliance. 
 
The necessary documentation for the application of EUCs or export/import permits must be 
submitted well in advance to allow for the verification process by ACD and submission to 
DCAC and approval by NCACC where necessary. The approval is necessary only for 
contracting permits and other permit applications being subjected to the government 
departments participating in the permit application review process. In many cases the 
applications are submitted late and may be referred back to the project manager due to 
lack of sufficient information to make a decision. Due to grey areas in WA control lists 
(conventional arms and dual-use items) this sometimes delays decision making regarding 
whether the item is controlled or not. It is usually recommended that under such 
circumstances the item is assumed to be controlled and necessary documentation is 
applied for so that there are no further delays at a later stage. Should it turn out that the 
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item was non-controlled, this is seen as a vindication of the belief that arms control is not 
necessary as it just brings confusion. The DCAC, as the secretariat for the NCACC, 
receives the application and is supposed to give expert advice with regard to control lists 
and due to the fact that it is generally understaffed and therefore does not play this role 
effectively as it is supposed to.  Armscor ACD finds itself sometimes playing this role which 
brings confusion into the South African arms control environment which signals dysfunction 
in the arms control structure. An example is the confusion on who is responsible for signing 
the EUCs with some contractors under the impression that it is Armscor when it is from 
DOD.   
 
The factors to be considered when evaluating permit applications, as reflected in the policy 
for the control of trade in conventional arms in terms of the National Conventional Arms 
Control Act (Act 41 of 2002), are: 
 
• South Africa’s national interest and its international obligations and commitments,    
particularly as these relate to arms control, non-proliferation, disarmament and the 
implementation of international humanitarian law. 
• National policy not to trade in conventional arms and military equipment and/or 
material, equipment or technologies that could be used for the development or 
production of weapons of mass destruction, with countries of proliferation concern, 
countries involved in the systematic violation or suppression of humanitarian rights 
and fundamental freedoms, countries, individuals, groups, undertakings and entities 
involved in crime and countries, individuals, groups undertakings and entities 
involved in international crime 
• National policy to avoid trade in conventional arms with countries involved in armed 
conflict. 
In many countries this implies denial of exports to “pariah” states or regions of concern like 
Iran, Iraq, Syria, Venezuela and North Korea and each country must have a clear foreign 
policy on which country to enter into arms business with. In South Africa this is the 
responsibility of the NCACC, which is a committee comprised of ministers and deputy 
ministers, and its policy is not clear in this regard. Its transparency of the arms export 
decision-making processes is questionable (Lamb, 2009). This is problematic in the sense 
  6 
that the project managers need to know this information so as to identify the possible 
suppliers of arms and which countries may be considered for tenders.    
 
In many cases it turns out that the defence matériel of interest comes as a system of 
systems where other components are sourced from different countries, but then assembled 
by the country that won the tender. Then Armscor would be subjected to the arms export 
controls of each involved country.  It must be mentioned that for orders on foreign 
contractors it is a requirement that the supplier must make known all countries that will 
supply controlled defence matériel in terms of the contract to the APM in advance. Then the 
Programme Manager must consult with ACD in order to determine whether all supplier 
countries are acceptable to South African authorities, and inform the contractor. In reality it 
happens in some cases that other supplier countries would only be known once the 
procurement process has been started which results in EUCs being applied for late which 
then delays the process. In addition it might only be realised when applying for the EUC for 
that subsystem that the country that the components are sourced from is not considered a 
responsible trade partner by NCACC and hence no arms trade can be done with that 
country. This relates back to the issue of transparency which adds to the frustration of the 
project managers.   
 
The shipping of arms or defence matériel both by sea and air is problematic. Some of the 
airlines are reluctant to consider transporting arms due to the delays involved in declaring 
and requesting permission to use the airspace when the cargo includes arms. Many 
countries have a system of supporting their arms exports business whereby their national 
airlines would willingly transport the arms cargo from their arms manufacturers to their end-
user countries. An example is the British airlines which support the UK defence exports by 
being readily available to transport military equipment. This is not the case in South Africa 
as there is no policy to support the arms export trade by the South African national airline, 
South African Airways (SAA). Shipping by sea is also problematic especially with the 
growing threat of pirates in sea routes passing through the shores of countries like Somalia. 
The insurance of the arms is becoming extremely exorbitant and in some cases the 
insurers simply refuse as they consider the business too risky and/or immoral. It is difficult 
therefore to plan and execute the shipping of arms within tight project timeframes and 
delays are in most cases inevitable. Although Armscor has its own in-house 
Travel/Logistics units which have vast experience in shipping of controlled items but it 
  7 
happens that due to the desire by some of Armscor subsidiaries to cut costs, they will 
contract external shipping agencies (at lower prices) with little experience in shipping of 
controlled items. This in many cases ends in a disaster because the correct shipping 
procedures were not followed and ends up in the hands of the Armscor Travelling agency 
(AB Logistics) with no cost saving realised.   
 
Once the shipment has arrived at customs, it must be cleared and this requires that all the 
necessary documentation is available. It happens in some cases that due to delays in 
shipping some of the permits/temporary permits might have expired and hence a need 
arises to amend the permits. This is another process that may take time (necessary 
approvals) with the shipment incurring storage costs while at customs. The lack of an 
integrated electronic system between the various agencies (Armscor, DCAC, customs) to 
track or verify EUCs or permits is also a problem which may result in some of this 
documentation being lost. The lack of alignment of control requirements at customs with 
those of the arms control often result in controlled items entering the country without the 
necessary documentation. These loopholes are incentives for those less committed to arms 
controls to try to by-pass the system.  
 
Once the item has been received by the APM, an arms control declaration forms part of the 
delivery documentation from the contractor to be submitted for payment. The contractor 
must provide for each consignment to the Armscor Finance Department, in duplicate, the 
following: 
• A list of all items for which the EUCs/EUUs were required by the governments of 
supplier countries, together with copies of the relevant EUCs and/EUUs ; or 
• If the consignment contains no EUC/EUU controlled matériel, a statement to this 
effect. 
There are also quality control checks culminating in the issuing of the K225 signalling that it 
is in good condition and it meets the specifications of the client and is then handed over to 
the SANDF. This is an area that is often clouded with confusion to the detriment of a good 
service to our client where the K225 would be issued when the equipment was not in a 
working condition. 
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1.3 Problem Review 
 
Further mind-mapping the issues mentioned in the brainstorming session and opened up in 
the Problem In Context (PIC) the challenges facing the implementation of the arms control 
system revolve around people management (leadership, change of attitude etc), alignment 
and co-ordination of the activities of the role-players (ACD, DCAC and NCACC, 
shipping/travel agents, customs, industry), policies with regard to implementation of arms 
control and implementation tools or procedures. From these, five themes which include 
issue of procurement of certain defence matériel (non-substantial items and Small Arms 
and Light Weapons (SALW) and their control, alignment and co-ordination of the activities 
of the role-players, grey areas in conventional arms and dual use control lists, lack of 
monitoring of compliance and leadership emerge.  
 
The SALW are particularly of interest given their widespread proliferation and use in human 
right violations in countries ravaged by civil wars. Thus it is of interest to review National 
NCACC policies and regulations and investigate how these issues are handled. The 
NCACC Act is based on the WA arrangement control list but as mentioned earlier the WA 
is not prescriptive on how countries must implement the arrangement which gives room for 
manipulation to responsibly promote arms trade for the economic well-being of our country.  
 
The structure of an organisation is considered as one of the important factors that 
determine success of any strategy and in our context one may be looking at the structure of 
the Armscor  and its ability to respond to environmental changes like legislation and be 
supportive of the arms control strategy and the arms control structure in South Africa i.e. 
how the role-players link up and interact with each other, their alignment and coordination 
in the acquisition cycle.  It is important that all the role players should base their strategy on 
the balance between responsible arms control system and the desire to promote arms 
trade for the economic well being of our country. This is particularly important for DCAC 
and NCACC as they issue the EUCs and permits and hence if they have not optimally 
tuned their system they could limit arms trade to the detriment of the defence industry. This 
alignment of arms control strategy is a challenge as these organisations may differ with 
regard to their own structures (hierarchical structures/flat structures, bureaucratic structure) 
and size hence their response times to the changes in the external environment.  
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Some of the contractors of Armscor are small companies with no expertise on arms control 
and rely on shipping agents to take care of shipment of defence matériel and adherence to 
associated regulations. Another element of structure concerns the NCACC where it is 
argued that the decision level may be high and hence it stifles processing of permits. It is 
often argued that if the foreign policy is more mature, clear guidelines could be formulated, 
decisions taken on a lower level, as in the US system, which results in a transparent 
system and shorter processing times. The chemical and biological warfare agents are 
controlled by the NPF which is under the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and it 
seems to be well structured and developed. Another possibility could be to merge the 
NCACC and Non-Proliferation Council (NPC) structures to provide a single point of 
application for permits from both.  
 
The attitude displayed by the project managers could be linked to the lack of knowledge 
about arms control issues which could emphasize the role of awareness programs, poor 
leadership or could be linked to a deeper problem, resistance to change which could 
emanate from the deeply embedded strong cultures characteristic of huge organisations 
like Armscor. As leaders in organisations are expected to be agents of change, any efforts 
to bring about change in the organisation must start with them and equip them not to only 
be able deal with change but should then influence their subordinates in the direction of 
change. The internal environment (culture of the organisation) must be also be conducive 
to change (implement arms control).  
  
 
1.4 Problem Statement and Objectives 
 
This research will examine at the factors that affect the effectiveness of arms control 
policies and regulations at Armscor and its contractors. These include the NCACC policies 
and regulations, effectiveness of leadership of APMs and those of contractors, monitoring 
systems and the South African arms control structure.  
 
 
The objectives of this research are: 
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• Review the arms control legislation specifically regulations with a view to 
identifying grey areas or areas that may have broad interpretations such that 
these can be used to create loopholes 
• Analyze the annual expenditure on controlled defence matèriel procured by 
Armscor and its contractors for the SANDF with a view to establishing the 
potential risk associated with non-compliance. This could be realised as loss of 
business to Armscor due to blacklisting 
• Establish the level of arms control awareness and the effectiveness of leadership 
with regard to arms control issues at Armscor and its contractors 
• Examine the South African arms control structure and identify possible synergies 
in key role players that could be exploited in the best possible alliance structure 
 
1.5 Importance of the study 
 
The NCAC Act demands that organisations/companies that are involved in arms trade must 
comply with the Act that promotes responsible arms trade in line with the WA and other 
treaties which the South African government is signatory to. The implementation of the 
arms control practice at Armscor faces a number of challenges that are related to the arms 
control regulations which seems to be linked to the interpretation of the items. Non-
compliance to arms control has serious implications for Armscor, which is an acquisition 
agent of the SANDF, as it has a potential to render the para-statal redundant. This is a 
possibility as non-compliance with export controls of countries like the US carries a penalty 
to the extent of trade embargo and since the US is one of the largest exporters of defence 
matèriel to South Africa and such a penalty can render Armscor redundant. In fact Armscor 
was blacklisted by the US in 1994 due to the illegal transfer of defence technology during 
the 1980’s and that was resolved in 1997 following a government-to-government 
agreement in which Armscor and Denel agreed to implement internal arms control 
compliance programmes to the satisfaction of the US government.  
 
Thus in this study the NCACC policy and regulations will be reviewed with the aim of 
closing any identified gaps, examine the effectiveness of leadership with regard to arms 
control issues and the South African arms control structure and hence limit the possibility of 
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non-compliance of Armscor and its contractors to export controls of supplier countries. That 
is hoped to strengthen the position of Armscor as an acquisition agent of the SANDF.  
 
1.6 Road Ahead 
 
Having reflected on the issues (in Problem Review) opened up in the Problem in Context 
there is a need to look deeper into these issues to attempt to understand. This is done in 
the following chapter, Problem Analysis, where theory and management models are 
interrogated and exploited in pursuit of a better understanding of these issues rather than 
simply presenting the models.  
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CHAPTER 2 
        FOUNDATION OF STUDY 
2.1 Problem Analysis 
 
The success of the implementation of a strategy (arms control) of any organisation 
depends on the structure, systems and culture.   The main issues that have emerged from 
the problem review fit into the three main pillars (structure, systems and culture) that 
support the strategy and theories and models on how these three pillars align with each 
other for the success of the strategy will be used to understand better issues underlying 
arms control at Armscor.   Particular attention will be given to the theories and models that 
relate to the objectives of the project that have been proposed earlier.  
 
In the context of this study it will be of interest to consider the structure of Armscor on its 
own and the structure of the arms control environment i.e. how all the different role-players 
are linked with each other.  The structure of an organisation is also acknowledged to be 
critical to the success of the strategy in that, for example hierarchical structures are 
perceived to be rigid and bureaucratic and are slow to respond to challenges in very 
dynamic environments.  Hence for organisations that operate under turbulent environments 
there is a move towards dynamic and responsive structures like adhocracies. Mintzberg’s 
(Segal-Horn, 2006) model of the structure of organisations highlights two elements that 
determine the structure. These are the six basic parts (strategic apex, technostructure, 
middle line, support staff, ideology and operating core) and the six coordinating 
mechanisms (mutual adjustment, direct supervision, standardisation of work processes, 
outputs, skills and norms) that link the basic parts together and describe the way in which 
the organisation co-ordinate the work.  
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                           Figure 2.1: The six basic parts of the organisation 
 
The strategic apex is the top management; the operating core is where the basic work of 
producing the organization’s products and services gets done; the middle line are those 
managers who are the link between the strategic apex and the operating core; the techno-
structure is the staff that design and maintain the systems for work processes; support staff 
are those who support the organisation outside of its operating flow; ideology are the 
beliefs and traditions within the organization. The structure of Armscor could be described 
as dominantly machine bureaucracy with elements of professional bureaucracy. The 
machine bureaucracy is characterized by an elaborate administration, a large 
technostructure to design and maintain its systems of standardisation, a large hierarchy of 
middle line managers to control the highly specialized work of the operating core. The 
effectiveness of an arms control system depends partly on an integrated electronic system 
that must link the various role-players and this is lacking in the South African arms control 
environment. This is important for tracking the progress of application of permits and EUCs 
and verification of these by agencies like customs. With Armscor playing the dominant role 
in this environment, one can question the strength of its technostructure to support the 
arms control in terms of designing and maintaining on-line IT systems for the application 
and tracking of permits and EUCs. This approach has been adopted by countries like the 
UK (Parish, 2009) and has proved to be very effective in avoiding delays in the acquisition 
process due to verification process and related documentation loss.  It is also important to 
look at the role of the strategic apex as this is considered to be critical in encouraging and 
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enforcing arms control compliance as was realised by a German firm, Leybold AG, in their 
radical transformation of their internal compliance system (Albright, 2002). In that system a 
senior export-responsible executive who is held personally accountable for any illegal 
actions by the firm is nominated. Armscor, in its structure, has a similar role (DACO) 
although it is not explicitly pronounced that he will be personally accountable for any illegal 
actions by the firm and he is not involved in the day-to-day management of the ACD as was 
the case in Leybold AG.  Although the model of Leybold AG worked well in implementing a 
very stricter internal compliance system it could be argued that such a high level 
involvement could stifle the processing of application due to high level approvals.    
 
It is also of interest to look at the structural alignment and coordination of the various role-
players as they are supposed to share the arms control strategy. Albright et al (2002) 
acknowledges that effective export controls must be a combined effort between 
governments and companies. They emphasize the government’s role in developing policies 
to better regulate export controls and create an environment supportive of non-proliferation 
efforts, industry’s role in developing internal compliance systems to ensure strict adherence 
to governments’ policy and the need for companies and governments to work together to 
enforce those policies. The models on network structures and strategic alliances can be 
used to reveal the underlying complexities with regard to alignment and coordination of the 
organisations. The network structure is a flexible, non-hierarchical organisational form that 
groups together a series of independent organisations or Strategic Business Units to 
design, produce and market a given product. It is common in dynamic and complex 
environments where creativity, innovation and speed of response are key sources of 
advantage and fundamental to the effectiveness of the organisation. The organisation 
concentrates on its distinctive areas of competencies while integrating efficiencies from 
other firms, each concentrating on their distinct areas of expertise (Boojihawon, 2006).  
With this background the different organisations/agencies, being involved at different 
stages of the acquisition process, could be pictured as resembling the modular 
organisational design of the network structure.  
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Figure 2.2: Modular structure depicting the various partners in the Armscor arms control 
environment 
  
Although this module is most common in product markets it could be used to understand 
the service market as in the context of this study. The success of the modular 
organisational design depends on the level of mutual co-operation and agreement about 
the division of tasks and responsibilities between the organisation of interest (the role-
players). One may then move to ask the following questions: 
• Is there a mutual co-operation between the partners? If any to what extent does it 
promote arms control? 
• To what extent do the partners integrate efficiencies from other firms or are they 
exploiting any synergies between them? An example may be: To what extent is 
DCAC exploiting the knowledge base available at Armscor? Do the contractors 
for Armscor use the AB logistics facilities as a shipping agent with vast 
experience on arms control? 
 
Customs 
Shipping 
agents 
Contractors 
DCAC 
Armscor 
(ACD) 
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While highlighting the benefits of network structures it must be mentioned that if the 
relationships have not handled properly such modular structures may be adversely affected 
by tensions between the partners and collaborators which may result in its collapse.  
 
A less distinct structure is strategic alliances which is just a cooperative arrangement 
between two or more firms used to improve their competitive position and performance by 
sharing resources (Segal-Horn, 2004, 355). The relationship between the role-players 
could be viewed as strategic alliance and these can be developed and managed as a 
critical capability by defining the alliance scope, selecting the right alliance partner and 
configuring, optimizing and exploiting alliance resource. The issue in our context could be 
alliance scope and configuring, optimizing and exploiting alliance resource as the partner 
selection is not a matter of choice.  The issues around the alliance scope definition could 
involve concentrating on solving immediate problems that are affecting the arms control, 
technologies to be employed and developed in the alliance. On resource configuration the 
alliance may look at how they can exchange, absorb and utilize the tacit knowledge within 
their alliance environment.  One may also look at building social capital in the form of 
information sharing, trust, norms of reciprocity and the value created from the alliance 
through enhancing resources and capabilities, facilitate learning. This raises the question 
whether the problems associated with lack of alignment and coordination between the role-
players could be related to lack of alliance scope definition, trust, norms of reciprocity, 
building of resources and capabilities and facilitation of learning particularly between ACD 
and DCAC.  The issue of trust could be a problem with ACD sometimes playing an advisory 
role when it is viewed as part of industry, norms of reciprocity particularly from DCAC for 
the role of ACD; Is there value created with regard to building resources and capabilities 
from the ACD-DCAC interactions? 
 
The systems, which are considered as management systems to provide the mechanism for 
communication, decision making and control at operational and strategic level to allow the 
organisation to operate and develop, will undoubtedly determine the success of the 
strategy. These systems can be operational (working practices and routines) and control 
(mechanisms to monitor the achievement of strategic goals). The implementation tools or 
procedures that were mentioned in Problem Review would fall under the systems. In the 
context of this study interest would be on decision-making and control tools and these 
could be done through policies (legislation and regulations), arms control practice, EUC, 
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permits and compliance audits.  Effective implementation of a strategy requires integration 
of many types of knowledge embodied in people and practices across the organisation 
(Booijihawon, 2006, 41). Operational systems can contribute to making this process more 
efficient and also enable the organisation to use its knowledge to adapt to its changing 
circumstances. It is acknowledged that in dynamic environments the key challenge is to 
enable this integration in ways that preserve the operational efficiencies of the organisation. 
It is suggested that this could be achieved through organisational learning which may be 
unique to each organisation. In organisations with flatter structures like an adhocracy, 
which support and encourage close and frequent face to face contacts between 
professionals and thus encourage organisational learning, operational systems tend to 
preserve operational efficiencies. However in larger organisations with complex structures 
there is a danger that its operational systems may be the sources of inefficiencies and 
overtime the organisation becomes slow and unresponsive to change. One may then be 
interested to know if the operational systems at Armscor may have contributed to making 
the process of integrating knowledge and practices in the organisation in a way that 
preserve operational efficiencies or they have become sources of inefficiencies. The 
interpretation of the arms control legislation and the associated regulations has in many 
instances proved to be cumbersome and some may have broad interpretation such that 
they can be sources of loopholes to beat the system. Although the ACD has conducted a 
number of arms control awareness programmes this does not seem to be reflected in 
behaviour and knowledge displayed by project officers as they interact with ACD. Could 
these signal problems with organisational learning generally within the organisation? Could 
the machine bureaucratic structure of the organisation indicated earlier be unsupportive to 
operational systems such that they become sources of inefficiencies? 
 
Simon (Booijihawon, 2006, 48) proposed four basic dynamic control levers that when used 
collectively can reconcile the conflict between flexibility and control in an organisation. 
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          Figure 2.3: Simons four basic control levers (Booijihawon,2006) 
 
Armscor, which has been in existence for more than 30 years has well established beliefs 
and boundary systems to promote the commitment of employees to the core values of the 
organisation in pursuing its strategic goals and to indicate the boundaries of acceptable 
domain of activity. The effectiveness of the belief and boundary systems may be 
questioned as it is expected to guide the project managers whereas their attitude indicates 
otherwise. The interactive control systems stimulate search and learning permitting new 
strategies to develop throughout the organisation as individuals respond to perceived 
opportunities and threats. An effective interactive system normally includes four distinct 
features: it keeps strategic information up to date for management, the information is 
organised and accessible to managers at all levels in the organisation, it encourages 
strategic decision making in a process of dialogue between superiors, subordinates and 
peers and it serves as catalyst for ongoing debate and critical thinking about underlying 
data, assumptions, and action plans (Booijihawon, 2006, 47). There is evidence for 
interactive control systems at Armscor in that there is constant review of arms control 
practice in the light of changes in the arms control legislation and from day-to-day 
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experiences of running the arms control system and these would, after scrutiny by relevant 
committees, be posted on the intranet for access by all members of the organisation. 
However there is not much evidence of a process of dialogue between superiors, 
subordinates and peers for strategic decision making and ongoing debate and critical 
thinking about underlying data, assumptions and action plans.  It is not clear whether this 
could be linked to the attitude displayed by the project managers perhaps as they are not 
involved in debates to challenge the underlying data, assumptions and action plans on 
arms control issues. More critical though may be the diagnostic control systems where 
managers track the progress of individuals and divisions towards achieving strategically 
important goals. ACD conducts audits on the projects and contractors to check arms 
control compliance and ACD may also be audited by NCACC Inspectorate. Feedback 
would always be given to the auditee so that they may attend to any problems that may 
have been identified. As there are many contractors and projects that ACD oversees, 
audits have not taken place as regularly as it is expected and therefore arms control 
compliance generally at Armscor and its contractors has not been fully assessed.  
 
 
For an organisation to be successful it is expected that its culture must facilitate and drive 
the strategy and some authors would refer to this as alignment of culture with strategy. 
Such cultures share common principles (Venter, 2006, 433): 
• They create a shared identity for employees  
• They serve as a guide “on how things are done” through shaping work processes, 
work environments, employee behaviour and customer orientation. 
• Ethical business practices and strong values should infuse the organisational 
culture 
• There is fit between new employees and organisational culture 
• It focuses on high performance, output, quality and superior service 
• It should legitimize the role of management in organizing through folklore, heroes 
and others. 
These principles seem to be related to the Simons belief control system and emphasize 
shaping employee behaviour to work towards strategic objectives of the organisation. The 
alignment of strategy and culture is acknowledged to be problematic particularly with strong 
or deeply embedded established cultures which have a tendency to resist any attempt at 
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strategic change. It tends to preserve those values, beliefs, relationships and patterns of 
behaviour that have been the very reason for the success of the organisation in the first 
place. At Armscor the role of culture to support the arms control strategy may be 
questioned. Could the culture of the organisation be contributing to resistance to change by 
the project managers i.e. implement and comply with arms control?  
 
The cultural web can be used to look at the challenges of attitude and resistance to change 
by project managers which could reflect a leadership. The cultural web is normally used to 
discover the nature of the organisation in cultural terms, how it impacts on the strategy they 
are following and the difficulties of changing it (Segal-Horn, 2004, 282). It is used to identify 
the key levers for implementing strategic change in the organisation.  
 
 
 
                                             Figure 2.4 The cultural web of Armscor 
 
The paradigm, which is a core set of beliefs and assumptions common to the organisation, 
can cause significant resistance to change and this can be seen clearly when one looks at 
the wider context in which it is embedded. This paradigm at Armscor could be regarded as 
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“delivery on project on time and on budget” which may be interpreted by other employees 
as “ delivery on project on time and budget regardless” where proper procedures like arms 
control may not be followed all in pursuit of delivering on time.  The project managers are 
part of the power structure who have powers to make decisions with regard to the project 
and thus to some extent define the cultural paradigm. The financial control system to 
deliver on project within budget puts pressure on project managers to deliver on time to 
avoid penalties as the latter will reflect negatively on the project manager on his balanced 
scored performance system. This is a tricky situation as one has to balance client 
satisfaction (delivery project on time and within budget) against following proper procedures 
like the arms control.  
 
2.2 Road Ahead 
 
Having applied theory and business models to unravel the complexities of the issues it is 
very appropriate to find out how the researchers worldwide have approached these issues 
and what did they find out. It is further important to compare and contrast the different 
approaches employed and if there are any agreements or disagreements in the findings 
with the idea of equipping extracting any relevant information that may be useful designing 
an appropriate research design and methodology so as to reach conclusions with 
confidence. This is done in next chapter, the Literature Review.   
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 Chapter 3 
    Literature Review 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The approach to the literature will be to bring forward evidence that highlights the potential 
impact of arms control on the business goals of companies involved in defence material 
trade and thus to the economy of those countries. This will be followed by a brief look at 
arms control systems of various countries in relation to the South African arms control 
system and to highlight any unique challenges that South African arms control system 
faces. Then the literature on the use of theories and models introduced in Problem analysis 
on the implementation of corporate strategies is discussed as it is believed even though 
they are not particularly focused on the implementation of arms control strategy it is hoped 
that these could be applicable to the latter.    
 
3.2 Impact of Arms Control 
 
The impact of a responsible arms control on defence exports and hence economy of a 
particular country is a reality and has been assessed by countries like the UK (Dunne and 
Freeman, 2003; Sharp, 2005; Martin et. al., 1999; Martins, 2001). For UK the possible 
causes of a fall in defence exports and consequential net losses to British national income 
are a contraction in foreign demand (worldwide or UK defence equipment only) and a 
greater impact of British governmental controls on defence exports (Sharp, 2005).   
However the weaker market for UK defence matériel or voluntary curtailing the supply of 
specialised goods or services for which it has developed a comparative advantage was 
suggested to be the likely cause of net losses to UK national income rather the UK controls 
of defence exports. Martin (2001) found that adoption of a significantly more ethical arms 
control export policy or participation in an international agreement to reduce arms exports, 
would have considerable economic implications for the British economy. These findings are 
not limited to UK as found by Porteous and Verbeke (1989) where they found out that the 
Canadian export control system has a number of unnecessary constraints in the form of 
unnecessary direct costs or lost and discouraged sales for firms. Although this work was 
done in the vey early days of export controls (about 1989) through Coordinating Committee 
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for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls (COCOM), these issues are still applicable to the 
current situation. COCOM was replaced by Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) and operates 
using similar control lists but slightly different policies but the burden from administration 
and enforcement of the export laws exists. There are calls for more restrictive arms export 
control policy in the UK (Dunne and Freeman, 2003) and in the US (Kovac, 2009) which 
further put pressure on effectiveness of arms control systems of organisations to comply 
while not limiting the responsible arms trade business. 
 
3.3 Arms Control Systems of Various Countries 
 
Although South Africa increased its defence exports between 1990 and 1995 it is still 
regarded as a very minor player in the international armament market (less that 0.5% of the 
world trade in conventional arms) (Beri, 2001), which makes it a big importer of defence 
material and hence subject to the export controls of the supplier countries like the UK, US, 
Sweden and Germany.  South Africa does significant arms trade business with the US and 
UK and it would be worthwhile to look at how their arms control is approached and also to 
look at systems of countries that that may have similar defence exports outputs with South 
Africa like Australia and Canada (Information supplied here has been obtained from links of 
participating countries from the Wassenaar arrangement website www.wassenaar.org). 
The US has a very complex arms control set-up that is mainly through the Directorate of 
Defence Trade Controls within the Department of State that issues permits and EUC and it 
spans a number of other departments that include Defence, Justice and Intelligence 
Community. This reflects the efforts to find balance between the enforcement of the arms 
control by the Department of State, Justice and Intelligence community and the promotion 
of arms trade for the economy of the country which is spearheaded by the Department of 
Commerce. There are enforcement challenges mainly due to lack of clarity on what should 
be controlled, and how, and overlapping jurisdiction particularly between the Departments 
of State and Commerce. 
 
In the UK the Export Control Organisation (ECO) is the UK’s strategic export licensing 
authority and it forms part of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) and 
uses the UK Strategic Export Control Lists made up primarily of the UK National Military list 
and the EU Dual-use list. ECO operates in close conjunction with the Foreign Office, 
Ministry of Defence, Department of International Development and Her Majesty’s Revenue 
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and Customs (HMRC). Each department plays a key in licence decisions as guided by the 
Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria and the HMRC is the 
enforcement arm, responsible for verifying licences at ports and airports, for imposing 
penalties and prosecuting exporters for breaches of export control legislation. In Australia 
the Department of Defence is responsible for administering controls on the export of 
defence and dual-use goods and the granting of authorisation to export, in the form of 
permits and licences and with it this role is done by Defence Export Control Office (DECO). 
All items (including non-military items) are subject to control are listed in the Defence and 
Strategic Goods list.  
In Canada the Export and Import Controls Bureau (TPI) is responsible for administering the 
Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA) through the use of Import Control List, the Export 
Control List and Area Control List. The EIPA delegates to the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
wide discretionary powers to control the flow of goods contained in specified lists under the 
Act and the Minister of International Trade provides policy direction in most areas involving 
market access and trade policy. Investigators from Canada Border Services Agency and 
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police enforce the EIPA. It is evident from this expose that 
countries that have a high defence export output (US and UK) tend to have more complex 
systems involving a number of departments to support each other. Although these systems 
seem to be effective they face a challenge of overlap of roles that often leads to confusion 
and tensions. However countries with relatively lower defence export output tend to have 
simple systems with a one distinct export control agency that does not focus only on 
defence exports but encompass controls on agricultural products, textiles and clothing. The 
South African arms control agency is the NCACC with DCAC as its directorate and is within 
the Department of Defence. However the South African system seems to be unique due to 
the presence of Armscor as an acquisition agency of the SANDF and is housed in the 
same building with the DCAC. Although this arrangement seems to have its merits it also 
faces challenges of strategy alignment and exploitation of synergies. 
 
3.4 Role of Leadership 
 
It is widely acknowledged that organizational success in obtaining its goals and objectives 
depends on managers and their leadership styles (Rad and Yarmohammadian, 2006). The 
ability of the leaders to influence subordinates to performing at their highest capability and 
towards a certain direction is important. The subject of leadership has been researched by 
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many researchers and they seem to be focused basically on two levels, strategic 
leadership and team leadership. Although the thrust in the context of this study is more on 
team leadership, it will be of interest to also look briefly on strategic leadership as it is also 
important especially for developing policies as may be the case for the NCACC. Strategic 
leadership is about leading the entire organization (Venter, 2006, 355) to create strategic 
change through other people so as to position organizations in the environment for both 
short-term stability and long-term viability. Denton (2003) suggested that there are gaps in 
leadership competence in South Africa to deal with new challenges like experienced 
international competitors, increased labor demands and implementation of affirmative 
action. These challenges are further exacerbated low levels of productivity, a lack of 
international business experience, a poor product and service quality record. Some of 
these issues are relevant if the interest in on leadership at Armscor and implementation of 
arms control strategy. Many authors consider leadership as one of the dimensions of 
culture (Ginevicius and Vaitkunaite, 2006) and coupled together can facilitate or hinder a 
firm’s strategic actions. This is due to the fact culture influences the behaviour of 
employees, directed at achieving organisational objectives (Struwig and Smith, 2002). 
Other authors (Robinson and Harvey, 2008) emphasize the need of leaders to adapt their 
leadership thinking to be effective in culturally diverse situations. In a culturally divers world, 
leaders need to be sensitive to the differing needs among followers and become skilful at 
assessing at assessing which values are most appropriate and and to adapt their 
leadership practices accordingly. There is also evidence to link the effectiveness of leaders 
on culture where in organizations with strong cultures the directiveness and strength of the 
leader can stifle the expression of diverse views (Jaskyte, 2004). In those situations 
individuals choose not to express differing views out of fear of ridicule and rejection. This 
could have implication for project teams at Armscor with regard to diverse views on arms 
control compliance. This emphasizes the role of the project manager as the change agent 
in this regard. The influence of leaders on employees behaviour to innovate has been 
highlighted by other authors (Jong and Hartog, 2007). Block (2003) examined the nature of 
the relationship between leadership and organisational culture and found out that 
leadership styles of immediate supervisors were significantly related to employee 
perceptions of organisational culture. This associated proactive leadership behaviours to 
positive cultural perceptions among employees.  
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3.5 Strategic Alliances 
 
For an organization to be successful strategic leadership must be complemented by team 
leadership to direct operations. Robbins and Decenzo, 2004, 327) outlines the team 
leadership role as being played through acting as a liaison with external constituencies, 
trouble-shooter, coach and conflict manager. In that context Thite (1999) attempted to 
identify the key characteristics of leadership in technical project team environment. In this 
study they recognized that the personality and professional profiles of technical 
professionals are quite different from those of other occupational groups which may help to 
explain why technical professionals are perceived to lack leadership skills. It was shown 
that managers of more successful projects exhibited transformational and technical 
leadership behaviours to a greater extent than their counterparts of less successful 
projects. In this scenario transformational leadership in which the leaders identify 
themselves as change agents and have an interesting and matching self-concept is 
promoted. It is also important to be aware of different leadership practices in different 
countries (McCarthy, 2005) in organisations that have increased exposure to international 
business practices, collaborative projects or supply chains like Armscor.  
 
Strategic alliances are fast and flexible ways to access complementary resources and skills 
that reside in other companies.  There are many collaborative advantages in strategic 
alliances and one can mention cost reduction or efficiency increase which may be achieved 
through coordination of activities and complementary capabilities (Gomez et. al., 2006).   
This is of particular interest to this study due to the need to align and coordinate the 
activities of various role-players in arms control. The role that IT plays as a supportive tool 
in alliances is often suggested as a reason for the fast growth of networks as it reduces the 
loss of information resources in the network, knowledge integration and it also contributes 
to leverage the value created in alliances through the joint use by partners of design, 
engineering or computer assistance in control systems. It has been observed that for 
companies that have dedicated alliance function (Hewlett-Packard, Oracle, Eli Lilly and 
company and Parke-Davies) have been capable of generating more alliance value than 
others without (Dyer et. al, 2001). In that study they suggested that there are five stages of 
the life cycle of an alliance and each with relevant tools to use:  
 
• Alliance business case (value chain analysis, needs analysis checklist) 
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• Partner assessment and selection (cultural fit evaluation, due diligence) 
• Alliance negotiation and governance (alliance structure guidelines, alliance 
metrics framework) 
• Alliance management (problem tracking template, trust building, alliance 
communication infrastructure) 
• Assessment and termination (relationship evaluation form, termination checklist) 
 
Thus there is an organised way in which organisations can engage in strategic alliances 
that are effective although there may be challenges relating to mutual distrust between 
partners, technological and knowledge diversity, alliance organizational form or governance 
structure. 
 
In general the idea of collaboration between law enforcements agencies has been 
promoted by many countries but it would seem to be riddled by problems. Schneider and 
Hurst (2008) investigated the obstacles to an integrated, joint forces approach to organized 
crime in Canada and the results could relevant if one considers the interaction between 
ACD, DCAC and customs with regard to arms control issues. Some of the obstacles 
reported include technical obstacles (incompatible databases among agencies), resource 
shortages, secretive nature of their investigations (protection of information/information 
sharing), different mandates, and a law enforcing culture.  These obstacles are so serious 
that minimal intelligence sharing between CIA and FBI has been cited as on of the reasons 
why American authorities did not detect, anticipate, and prevent the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001. Trafford and Proctor (2006) in the study of successful join ventures in 
public-private partnerships cited five helpful characteristics that are usually present in 
successful partnership ventures and these include communication, openness, planning 
((alliance strategies), ethos and direction. The role of leadership was emphasized in setting 
the direction of the venture.  
 
3.6 Road Ahead 
 
All the earlier discussions have successively contributed to a better understanding of the 
main issues in this study and the information gathered will be used to develop a method 
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appropriate to achieve the objectives of the study and this will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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  CHAPTER 4 
           RESEARCH DESIGN AND THE METHOD 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Business research is defined as the planning, collection and analysis of data relevant to 
business decision-making and the communication of the results of this analysis to 
management (Coldwell and Herbst, 2004, 2). It is systematic and objective in that it must 
not be haphazard and must avoid distorting effects of personal bias. It can be basis or pure 
research where it is used to test and build specific theories and concepts or it can be 
applied research where it is used to facilitate managerial decision-making as it is the case 
in this study. The method maps the research process and the kind of tools and procedures 
that will be employed to achieve the objectives of the study. 
 
The goal of this study was to examine the factors affecting the effectiveness of the arms 
control at Armscor and its contractors with a view to come up with ideas to achieve an 
effective and responsible arms control system while not limiting the role of Armscor as an 
acquisition agent of the SANDF. To achieve that a number of objectives were proposed 
and data was collected and analysed so that these objectives were achieved. An effective 
and responsible arms control system is based on the government legislation on arms 
control and the associated regulations and translation of those into an arms control practice 
of Armscor. Thus it was of interest to examine the regulations for areas that are source of 
problems in implementing an arms control system. This relates to the first objective in our 
study and documentation review (arms control policy and regulations) and questionnaires 
to arms control compliance officers from DCAC, project managers and contractors were 
used to collect data to assess the leadership of the Armscor Program managers. It was of 
interest to also look at the component of the controlled defence matériel that has been 
procured by Armscor on behalf of the DOD over a number of years to give an indication of 
the impact of the potential loss of business due to the inability to procure controlled defence 
matériel in the event that Armscor was blacklisted. For that purpose records of import 
permits issued to Armscor by DCAC were analyzed. One of the requirements of an 
effective arms control system is the arms control awareness generally among project 
officers and contractors and leadership from project managers with regard to arms control. 
There is a need to assess the level of arms control awareness and effectiveness of 
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leadership with regard to arms control by project managers and information was obtained 
through questionnaires. An optimum structure between Armscor and other arms control 
role-players would facilitate compliance to arms control while also reducing delays 
throughout the acquisition process of the controlled defence matériel. One was interested 
here in the issues of alignment and exploitation of synergies between the role-players. This 
includes establishing strengths and weaknesses of the stakeholders and this information 
was obtained through interviews of senior people from the role-players.    
 
More elaborate discussion on these data collection will be given below in the form of the 
research design detailing the overall approach to achieve the objectives and the research 
methodology detailing how the data collection methods will be adapted and applied.  
 
4.2 Research Design 
 
As briefly mentioned in the previous section documentation reviews, interviews and 
questionnaires will be used to collect data. It is thus important to be aware of the strengths 
and weaknesses of these data collection methods as they relate to this study. 
 
4.2.1 Documentation review 
 
Documentary secondary data, which may include written documents (policies and 
regulations, administrative and public records) and non-written documents (films and 
television programs) may be used to provide qualitative and quantitative data when an in-
depth understanding of the document is required (Hofstee, 2006, 125; Saunders et al, 
2003, 190). In this study the following documents were reviewed: 
• the arms control legislation and the associated regulations with the goal of 
establishing how common violations are addressed.  
• compliance audit reports to establish the awareness of arms control by project 
officers and personnel of the contractors 
• records of import permits issued to Armscor by DCAC to determine the value of 
the defence matériel procured by Armscor for the SANDF.  
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The common problem with type of data collection method is the accessibility of the 
documents especially if these are external documents, this is the company project and the 
documents are not highly classified (top secret) hence these documents were easily 
accessible.  Generally researchers are warned of the sufficiency of the sources 
(documents) with regard to quality and quantity (Hofstee, 2006, 129). Armscor has well 
established record-keeping procedures and all the compliance audit reports were obtained. 
With regard to arms control legislation and associated regulation the documents were of 
good quality with regard to their eligibility and these were obtained from the Armscor Arms 
Control Division and the quality with regard to conciseness (lack of ambiguity) on arms 
control was partly what the project was attempting to establish. With regard to the arms 
control compliance audit reports the concern was the ability of the audit to meet its 
objectives which is related to its reliability and suitability. The ability of the auditor to 
conduct the audit that is free of errors is very important in audit effectiveness (Karapetrovic 
and Willborn, 2000). 
 
  
4.2.2 Interviews 
 
The interviews were used to obtain information about strengths and weaknesses of the 
role-players in the South African arms control environment in view of the fact that an 
integrated arms control system that exploited synergies between the role-players was 
expected to impact positively on compliance to arms control at Armscor. Interviews were 
also used in support of document review of arms control legislation and regulations with 
regard to problems experienced by project managers as they apply for EUCs and permits.  
 
There are three types of interviews (Saunders et al, 2003, 246):  
• structured -  uses questionnaire based on a predetermined and standardised or 
identical set of questions 
• semi-structured - non-standardised in that the researcher would have a list of 
themes and questions to be covered and these may vary from interview to 
interview 
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•  unstructured - informal  and no predetermined list of questions is used although 
the researcher needs to have a clear idea about the aspects that they want to 
explore.  
 
Semi-structured interviews were used as it was aimed at different organisations that are 
involved in different stages of the acquisition of defence matériel in the South African arms 
control environment and that few people will be interviewed. The questions were adapted 
and varied to obtain information that is relevant to that organisation. This allowed a full 
range and depth of the information to be obtained and also of further importance was the 
relationship that was established with the interviewee. The latter was very important as the 
author was very keen to establish a cordial relationship with the role players in arms control 
so that it could in future forums be established where arms control issues would be 
discussed. Interviews however suffer from the drawback of interviewer and interviewee 
bias. The interviewer bias is where the comments, tone or non-verbal behaviour of the 
interviewer create bias in the way that interviewees respond to the questions. It could also 
results in the way in which the interviewer interprets the responses.  The interviewee or 
response bias, which is common in semi-structured interviews where the interviewee may 
choose not to reveal and discuss an aspect of the topic you wish to explore perhaps due to 
the sensitive nature of the information. This was very relevant in this study as it was aimed 
at probing more about the strengths and weaknesses of the role players where 
interviewees may be unwilling to divulge information that damage the image of their 
organisation. There are key measures that a researcher may take to overcome bias and 
these may include: 
• Preparation and readiness for the interview 
• Level of information supplied to the interview 
• Nature of the opening comments to be made when the interview commences 
• Approach to questioning 
• Impact of the behaviour during the course of the interview 
• Ability to demonstrate attentive skills 
• Approach to recording information 
 
Face-to face interviews were conducted although if telephone interviews could have been 
considered if circumstances (distance, prohibitive costs, time) dictated. Face-to-face 
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interviews are advantageous as they help to establish a relationship with the interviewee 
and trust, which is very important particularly in exploring sensitive issues and they 
generally more effective than telephone interviews. Telephone interviews present practical 
challenges in that they may be difficult to control the pace of the interview and to record the 
data that is forthcoming and interviewer loses the opportunity to witness the non-verbal 
behaviour of the interviewee which may adversely affect the interpretation of how far to 
pursue a particular line of questioning.  
 
4.2.2 Questionnaires 
 
The questionnaires were used to determine the effectiveness of leadership of project 
managers and compliance officers in contractors in influencing project officers and 
procurement staff respectively in complying with arms control. There are many activities 
that project managers and compliance officers in contractors can do to provide leadership 
within their teams and environments and these include (Jong and Hartog, 2007): 
• Role modelling in compliance issues 
• Provide resources like relevant information 
• Monitoring compliance within their teams i.e. record keeping like of EUC, 
keeping track of controlled defence matériel 
The questionnaires were designed to establish the role of project managers and 
compliance officers at contractors to the mentioned roles with regard to arms control. 
 
Therre are basically two types of questionnaires: 
• Interviewer administered - telephone and structured interviews (refer to 4.2.2 on 
interviews) 
• Self-administered - on-line, postal and delivery and collection questionnaires 
 
Self-administered questionnaires were used and these were sent by email to the 
respondents. The on-line questionnaires offer some advantages with regard to prompt 
delivery at very low cost and it also offers greater control with regard to the identity of the 
actual person that responded as most users read and respond to their own mail at their 
personal computer. The major drawback of self-administered questionnaires is usually a 
low response rate from the participants as was the case with Struwig and Smith (2002) 
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when they used questionnaires in their survey in South Africa and achieved 6.27% 
response rate despite having taken measures to avoid this problem and seems to be 
related to whether the participant or their organization have vested interests in the 
outcomes of the study and also the survey has minimal disruption to the participant 
organisation with regard to time spent.  Block (2003) investigated the connection between 
leadership and culture of a certain company that was eager to participate in the research 
project because of an expressed interest in exploring new ways to remain competitive and 
hence the researcher was provided with a project assistant who agreed to visit each branch 
location to distribute and collect the completed surveys and 91% response rate was 
achieved. This seems to have been the reason that Rad and Yarmohammadian (2006) 
obtained a response rate of 85.68% when they studied the relationship between the 
manager’s leadership style and employees’ job satisfaction in Iranian hospitals. 
 
The general Interview guide approach was used where the same general areas of 
information were collected from each interview (Coldwell and Herbst, 2004, 55). This 
allowed the degree of freedom and adaptability in getting the information from the interview. 
Open ended questions were used in line with the semi-structured type of interview. 
 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Research instruments 
 
A research instrument is any tool that the researcher has used to obtain the data and these 
may be questionnaires, psychological tests and laboratory tests (Hofstee, 2006, 115). A 
summary of the data collection method, research instrument used and the purpose of their 
applications are given in Table 4.1 
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Table 4.1: Data collection methods, research instruments and their applications 
Data Collection Method Research Instrument Application 
   
Document Interview  1. Arms control legislation 
and regulations 
2. Audit reports 
3. Import permits issued to 
Armscor 
Interview Semi-structured interview 
focused on personnel, IT 
systems, productivity 
measurement 
Collect data on strengths 
and weaknesses of role-
players: capacity, technical 
skills, appropriate IT system 
Questionnaire Team Leadership 
questionnaire (Robbins and 
Decenzo, 2004, 326) 
Team leadership 
effectiveness of Armscor 
Project managers, at 
contractors 
 
 
4.3.1.1 Semi-structured interviews 
 
The aim of the interviews was to obtain information on the ability of the main role-players in 
the arms control value chain to fulfil their obligations and to identify factors that may be 
limiting them in fulfilling those obligations. In particular the interest was on human 
resources and capability/capacity to serve their clients, appropriate IT systems to support 
arms control any other factors that may limit them (refer to the questions used in Appendix 
D). This interest was driven by the fact that effective implementation of arms control 
demands human resources to process the huge load of permits, appropriate IT systems to 
track and verify permits at any stage of the arms procurement value chain:  
 
SANDF            ACD              DCAC              ABL           customs and technical capabilities 
to interpret arms control regulations. Very senior people were interviewed in each of the 
role players so that they could be able to answer all the questions.  
  36 
Appointments were made with the interviewees by telephone and they were conducted in 
the offices. 
 
4.3.1.2  Questionnaires 
 
The questionnaires were used to determine team leadership effectiveness of the leaders in 
the arms control environment. This was based on the idea that team leaders have four 
team roles to play and these are Robbins and Decenzo, 2004, 326): 
• Liaisons with external constituencies 
• Troubleshooters 
• Conflict managers and 
• Coach. 
 
The questionnaire consisted of 10 questions in each category (refer to Appendix E) for the 
questionnaire) with a five-point Likert scale scoring. The higher the score the more the 
team leaders play their team leadership roles. For example effective leaders would 
“Provide relevant information to their teams” which is very critical to arms control and 
therefore would score high on this statement. The questions from different roles were 
mixed and some of the questions were reversed to check if there was consistency with the 
responses of the respondents.  Most of the questionnaires were e-mailed to the 
respondents although a few of them were hand-delivered for people that did not have 
emails. 
 
4.3.2 Data 
4.3.2.1 Document Review 
 
The common issues with review of secondary data are suitability and related issues of 
reliability and validity (Saunders et al, 2003, 205). The suitability relates to the question 
whether the data provides one with the information that he needs. Is it in the correct 
format? This is irrelevant with regard to the arms control regulations. With regard to the 
compliance audit report and records of export and permits issued to Armscor by DCAC, 
these needed to be reorganized into a suitable format for analysis. 
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The reliability and validity are functions of the method by which data were collected and 
sourced. The reputation of the source is very important and the researchers may have trust 
in the method due to the reputation of the source. With regard to the compliance audit 
reports, these were done and compiled by ACD by a trained manager.  It is acknowledged 
that the success of the audit and hence the worthiness of the audit reports depends on the 
skills of the auditor and the available information (ref). Thus these audit reports are 
considered to be reliable and valid. The export/import records from ACD are also 
considered to be reliable and valid as these are generated from an IT database developed 
by SITA and it is also used for reporting to parliament on the export and import activities of 
defence matériel by South African industry.   
 
4.3.2.2 Semi-structured interviews 
 
The data quality issues related to semi-structured interviews are: 
• Reliability 
• Forms of bias 
• Validity and generalisability (Saunders et al., 2003, 252) 
 
The reliability in this case concerns whether alternative researchers would reveal similar 
information. It is considered, as in other studies (Saunders et al., 2003, 253), that an 
attempt to ensure that qualitative, non-standardised research could be replicated could be 
replicated could be replicated by other researchers would not be realistic or feasible without 
undermining the strength of the semi-structured interview. It is thus not the intention of the 
semi-structured interview to necessarily be repeatable as they reflect the reality at the time 
they were collected, which may be subject to change.  
 
The forms of bias that can be problematic here may be interviewer and interviewee bias. 
Although the author does not wish to judge himself on interviewer bias, it can be mentioned 
that attempts were made to limit this by avoiding comments, tone or non-verbal behaviour 
that would have influenced the interviewee to respond in a particular way. The data was 
obtained by interviewing senior people in their organisations. Although it can be trusted that 
due to their seniority in their organisations and their inherent integrity, the interview gave 
the true picture of their organisation, it is acknowledged that in some cases the 
  38 
interviewees may choose not to reveal and discuss an aspect of the topic that one would 
wish to explore as this would lead to probing questions that would intrude on sensitive 
information that they do not wish or are not empowered to discuss with the interviewer 
(Saunders et al, 2003, 253). The outcome would be that the interviewee gives a partial 
picture of the situation that casts himself or herself in a socially desirable role or the 
organisation for which they work for in a positive or negative fashion. It is noted that in the 
interviews conducted, the interviewees did not hesitate to highlight the shortfalls in their 
departments. The interviews were not recorded with a tape recorder but notes were taken 
throughout the interview and a full report was written immediately after the interview so that 
no important information was lost (Hofstee, 2006, 136). Given the fact that there were many 
unfavourable newspaper reports about how arms control has been handled by certain 
organisations, some of the interviewees seemed to be uncomfortable with being 
interviewed in the first place and through persuasion were willing for a more informal 
interviewee. As the interview was not using closed questions, the lack of recording did not 
affect the capturing of the responses of the interviewees.  
 
As the interviews involved different organizations involved at different stages of the arms 
procurement, it is not the intention to make generalisations from the data.   
In addition to what has been discussed above the following were noted from the interview: 
• As the interviewees were senior people in the organisations it was difficult to 
secure interviews with them. In certain cases the interviews were conducted in 
awkward times, close to knock off time and therefore not in enough time to 
explore the topic. 
• Some of the interviewees were very enthusiastic about arms control and it was 
difficult to control the interview and limiting it to the asked questions. 
  
4.3.2.3 Questionnaires 
 
The questionnaires were primarily aimed at assessing the leadership of project managers 
at Armscor and all those project managers that had dealings with ACD with regard to 
permits were sent the questionnaires and all those project managers returned their 
questionnaires. Thus it is considered that the sample was representative of the population. 
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The questionnaires were also sent to project managers in external contractors and 
although a few did not return their questionnaire the response rate was good.  
 
Due to time constraints the questionnaire was piloted using staff members in the division 
and family at home. The questionnaire was discussed with my internal promoter and it was 
sent to one of the respondents in the Arms Control Division for comments. They were 
requested to comment on whether the email introducing the questionnaire was simple and 
easy to understand, due dates and the instructions on the questionnaire were clear and 
easy to follow. The email was improved with regard to the phrasing of certain questions and 
due dates that the questionnaires have to be returned.  
 
The reliability of the questionnaire was measured through internal consistency by 
correlating the responses of certain questions in the questionnaire with those to other 
questions in the questionnaire (Saunders et al., 2003, 310). Few check questions (to limit 
the length of the questionnaire) were used whereby alternative forms of the same question 
were compared. In addition for some of the respondents they were also rated by the 
colleagues or subordinates. 
  
4.3.3 Analysis 
4.3.3.1 NCAC policy and regulations 
 
The approach was to investigate from literature the most common violations of arms control 
and evaluate how these have been addressed in the regulations. This was done against 
the background of balancing between a responsible arms control system and flow of arms 
trade in the industry this involved looking at Wassenaar arrangement first and then the 
NCAC regulations.  
 
4.3.3.2 Arms control compliance audits 
 
The idea was to identify any deficiencies or findings as reported in the audit reports and this 
would indicate level of awareness of the project managers/compliance officers of the arms 
control. The fewer the findings the better is the awareness. 
 
  40 
4.3.3.3 Export/Import permit records 
 
A list of all import permits issued to Armscor for the years 2007/2008/2009 was compiled 
and this was related to the value of the defence matériel imported through those permits. 
This would give the value of the potential loss of business to Armscor if it were to be 
blacklisted by supplier countries. 
 
4.3.3.4 Interviews 
 
The data collected from the interviews was categorised and tabulated to clearly indicate the 
findings with regard to personnel required to service the clients, availability of appropriate 
IT system to support arms control, technical expertise to interpret the arms control 
regulations and any other strengths that may benefit other role-players. In that way it was 
easy to pick weakness and strengths and how the role-players can complement each other. 
 
4.3.3.5 Questionnaires 
 
The response rate was calculated as percentage of the completed questionnaires returned 
to the total questionnaires that were sent to the respondents. The completed 
questionnaires from the respondents were scored and the total percentage score was 
calculated. In addition the percentage score of each role was also calculated. For reverse 
questions the score were also reversed. For example for the statement” I do not have time 
to deal with conflict”, the respondent scored as 4 this was then scored as 0 and if the 
respondent scored as 3 it was then scored as 1 as it is believed that for good team 
leadership the leader should find time to deal with conflict. For cases where the leader was 
also rated by the subordinates or colleagues, the scores compared. It was also of interest 
to look at how the respondents scored on some of the statements that are considered to be 
particularly relevant to flow of information of arms control. These are: “I provide relevant 
information to my team:, “I organize forums where issues/problems are discussed with 
customers”. The responses were represented in bar charts. 
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4.3.4 Limitations 
 
The major limitation of this study emanates from the time constraints as effectively only five 
months was allocated to complete all the work in this project. Although the project was 
aimed at establishing the impact of arms control at Armscor and its contractors, it is 
acknowledged that not much attention was given to contractors. Proper attention to this 
would have required that all contractors that are contracted by our cardinal programs be 
identified and suitable respondents be identified for our questionnaire. Only those 
contractors that already interact with ACD were sent the questionnaires and therefore the 
results of this study may not generalised as depicting the true picture of leadership at 
contractors.  
 
It was initially envisaged that a leadership questionnaire (Bass et al., 1994) that has been 
proven to be reliable and effective in measuring the leadership was to be used but the cost 
proved to be prohibitive. Thus a questionnaire was designed but its effectiveness has not 
been proven and could affect the validity of the results. 
 
The literature on arms control available is mostly not from peer reviewed journals and 
therefore should be used with caution. Some was obtained from Institute for Science and 
International Security (ISIS) which is a credible organisation but some was obtained from 
internet which must be treated with care.  
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Chapter 5 
           RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Review of arms control legislation and regulations 
 
Due to limited time-frame of this project the arms control legislation and the associated 
regulations will be reviewed by identifying areas in the policy and regulations where most 
violations have occurred and examine how these areas are addressed in South African 
arms control regulations. In addition information gathered from the interviews with the role 
players (that include the defence industry) will be used to look at how the issues raised are 
addressed in the arms control laws and regulations.   Firstly it is necessary to briefly 
describe the basis of South African arms control laws and regulations as described in 
National Conventional Arms Control regulations. 
 
The regulations are derived from the Wassenaar Arrangement and the objectives of the 
latter are described below. 
 
5.1.1 Wassenaar Arrangement  
 
The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) is aimed at fostering multilateral cooperation to 
promote regional and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and 
greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and 
technologies, thus preventing destabilising accumulations. The participating states, through 
their national policies, must ensure that transfers of these items do not contribute to the 
development or enhancement of military capabilities which undermine these goals, and are 
not diverted to support such capabilities. The decision to transfer or deny transfer of any 
item is the sole responsibility of each participating state but they must notify other 
participants of these transfers and denials. 
 
The controls are guided by agreed Best Practices, Guidelines or Elements.  Participating 
states identify and agree on the items that should be the subject of national controls and 
maintain effective controls for items on these agreed lists. These items are included in two 
lists: a Munitions List and a List of Dual-Use Goods and Technology. The Munitions List, 
which has 22 different categories starting with the small arms and light weapons, moving to 
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ammunition, bombs, naval vessels, up to software and technology, defines the 
conventional arms which should be subject to national controls (Danielson, 2005). It covers 
about 300 different items. The Dual-Use list covers the goods and technologies which have 
civilian applications but could also be used for the production of arms or other military 
purposes. It has 9 different categories and covers about 1 000 items. 
In South Africa the WA is translated into the Policy for the Control of Trade in Conventional 
Arms which is then implemented through the NCAC regulations.  
 
5.1.2 Common violations and other problematic areas 
 
Literature indicates that most violations are related to the issues of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons (SALW) (Stemmet, 2001;Sabala, 2004) and these are achieved through 
procuring without necessary permits, misleading end-user declarations, loose regulations of 
brokers (Mepham, 2004;Schroeder and Lamb, 2006), lack of delivery verification and post-
shipment controls. What is also problematic regards the control of dual-use items and it 
seems there is also a lot of indecisiveness with regards to what items are controlled and 
which ones are not. At national level there seem to be a complaint that the control 
regulations are impractical in that they do not accommodate the operational needs of the 
industry. This refers particularly to the reluctance to issue open permits and then reporting 
on that permit after a certain period of about 6 months.   This would facilitate procurement 
of defence matériel in that it would avoid the delays that are experienced on emergency 
cases while waiting for permits. 
 
5.1.2.1 Small Arms and Light Weapons 
 
There seems to be evidence that even in countries that have robust an transparent 
systems of laws and regulations governing national holdings, manufacture and international 
movement of SALW, like the US, there were cases where it is unclear whether these have 
been supplied and processes followed to provide reassurances about end-use and 
retransfer (Waltz, 2007). It has been reported that arms brokers that operated from South 
Africa were involved in the shipment of SALW that were used in the Rwandan genocide 
(Ref). The WA recognizes the seriousness of control with regard to SALW and thus has 
“Best practices Guidelines for Exports of SALW” and affirms that participating countries will 
apply strict national controls on the export of SALW as well as on transfers of technology 
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related to their design, production, testing and upgrading. In the Southern Africa region 
these efforts are supported by a regional programme (The SADC Firearms Protocol) on 
SALW and illicit trafficking endorsed by SADC and European Union foreign ministers in 
1998 (Sabala, 2004).  
 
In NCACC regulations the SALW are clearly controlled under the munitions list (ML1, ML2 
and ML3) and the issues may relate to permits and verification of end-users.  The Policy for 
the Control of Trade in Conventional Arms describes the control process with regard to the 
application for the End-Use certificates and authentication, permits (Armaments 
Development and Manufacturing, marketing, contracting, conveyance, import, export and 
advanced marketing) and delivery verification and these have been sufficiently dealt with to 
control SALW. However, not much attention has been given to the control of arms brokers. 
While arms brokers may have a legitimate role to play in the legal arms trade, it has been 
reported that uncontrolled arms brokering activities often played a key role in facilitating 
arms transfers to embargoed states, conflict zones and rebel groups (Lunde, 2004). The 
NCACC regulations require traders to obtain armaments development and manufacturing 
permit s and contracting permits to render specified brokering activities related to 
conventional arms. In NCAC policy, brokering is only mentioned with regard to the 
contracting permit but there is no process to control it. The WA recommends that for 
activities of negotiating or arranging contracts, selling, trading or arranging the transfer of 
arms and related military equipment controlled WA Participating states from one third 
country to another third country, a licence or written approval should be obtained from the 
competent authorities of the Participating state where these activities take place whether 
the broker is a citizen, resident or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Participating 
State. Similarly, a licence may also be required regardless of where the brokering activities 
take place. The participating States may also limit the number of brokers and establish a 
register of brokers.  
 
5.1.2.2 Dual-use Goods and Technology 
 
The major challenges facing the control of dual-use goods and technology are identification 
and controllability. The difficulty lies in identifying which items are controlled and because 
some of these have legitimate civilian use, the controls may be less restrictive. These 
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challenges are even greater in intangible transfers (via non-physical means like electronic 
transfers, oral conversations) of dual-use goods than the tangible transfers.  
 
The list of dual-use goods and technologies has 9 categories which include Advanced 
Materials (1), Material Processing (2), Electronics (3), Computers (4), Telecommunications 
and Information Security (5), Sensors and Lasers (6), Navigation and Avionics (7), Marine 
(8) and Propulsion (9). In addition there is Annex 1 for Sensitive items and Annex 2 for Very 
Sensitive items.  The sensitive items are those items in the dual-use list which are key 
elements directly related to the indigenous development, production, use or enhancement 
of advanced conventional military capabilities whose proliferation would significantly 
undermine the objectives of the WA as compared to Sensitive list where those items are 
essential to the indigenous development, production, use or enhancement of advanced 
conventional military capabilities.   These classifications have implications with regard to 
the level of control of these dual-use items. The problems that are common in administering 
the NCACC regulations are whether certain items are controlled or not and which category 
(sensitive or very sensitive item). An example is the turbine engines which are 
commercially available and commonly used in industry but these have been used in 
frigates and the implication was that they are now controlled. The interpretation of certain 
clauses demands highly technical people who are specialists in their fields which the DCAC 
is lacking. In Sweden, they have a Technical and Scientific Council, which consists of 
representatives of several institutions with expertise in technological applications for both 
civilian and military uses to assist the ISP in connection with decisions concerning the 
classification of military equipment.   
 
5.1.2.3 Open permits 
 
The NCACC regulations require that for each consignment of conventional arms and 
designated dual-use goods to be exported or imported, a permit is required. In addition, 
under special circumstances a single export/import permit may be issued to cover several 
consignments. The latter is quite critical for the arms industry where delays due to process 
of obtaining the necessary permits may be very costly. An example may be the 
procurement of warranty spares from overseas suppliers to support the running of military 
aircraft by South African Air Force (SAAF). It is necessary to obtain these spares as a 
matter of urgency to avoid the time the aircraft is on the ground because it cannot fly.  
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Although the supplier may be able to supply the spares through air freight, this will be 
delayed by the application for the import permit. Although DCAC has mechanisms to 
accommodate emergency situation, project managers believe that an open permit for that 
particular aircraft may be obtained and spares be obtained using that open permit and 
report after a certain period of time. The DCAC seems to be reluctant to accommodate and 
it seems the trust between DCAC and industry is not at a level where this could be 
accommodated.  
 
This seems to be the approach with countries like Sweden, where companies with a 
manufacturing or supply licences are required by law to regularly report the details of 
defence matériel delivered and invoiced both in Sweden and abroad to the National 
Inspectorate of Strategic Products (ISP). In addition no marketing licence is required but 
companies are required to provide quarterly reports on their marketing of military 
equipment in other countries (Annual Report 2009) 
 
5.1.3 Summary 
 
It was found that the NCACC regulations do not give sufficient attention to the control of 
arms brokers in South Africa, there is not enough supporting technical skills to deal with 
control of dual-use goods and Technologies and the requirement of a import or export 
permit for each shipment limits the flow of business in the arms industry.   
 
 
5.2 Analysis of annual expenditure 
5.2.1 Introduction  
 
The aim of this section is to analyze the annual expenditure on controlled defence material 
procured by Armscor for the SANDF with the view to establishing the potential risk 
associated with breaching arms control measures which could result in loss of business 
due to blacklisting by supplier countries. The value of the controlled items procured, 
including repairs and spares, can be obtained by examining the values of the import 
permits issued by DCAC to Armscor in that particular year. This analysis could also reveal 
countries that have higher trade with Armscor which would imply that violating the arms 
control regulations of those countries could have catastrophic consequences to Armscor. It 
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must also be remembered though that most defence equipment come as systems and any 
system will in most cases be composed of components manufactured by different countries 
and assembled by one company that won the tender.  In fact most major defence 
companies have moved away from being manufacturing companies over a range of 
products to putting the products of contractors together, commonly referred to as systems 
integrators (Dunne and Haines, 2002). In that scenario the contractors must also verify the 
end-user and make a decision whether to accept or deny the request for their product. The 
inability to source a component from another country is problematic in that the complete 
system cannot be obtained. Although this may be viewed as an extreme in that it may be 
possible to obtain that specific component from another country, there is evidence that 
shows that the reporting of trade denials by a certain country makes other countries 
reluctant to trade with the denied country hence it may be difficult to obtain that item 
elsewhere (reference). In that case loss of business is the loss of the complete project.  
 
The approach in this section will be to give a brief picture of the South African military 
expenditure first so as to reflect on the imports of defence matériel to Armscor against this 
background. It will also be worthwhile to consider the most likely violations that can lead to 
blacklisting and the likelihood that the violation could happen in South African or Armscor 
environment. To summarize we will look at this problem by: 
• Examining the South African military expenditure 
• Analysis of import permits issued to Armscor by DCAC 
• Likely violations 
 
5.2.2 South African military expenditure 
 
Although South Africa is considered a very minor player in the international armaments 
markets (Beri, 2001), its defence industry has developed advanced technological 
capabilities to meet the requirements of the SANDF. The space industry is the only industry 
requiring more advanced technology and South Africa has abandoned its efforts in this 
area (Hatty, 1996). This will be evident also in the analysis of the import permits issued by 
DCAC to Armscor with bulk of the permits being due mainly to aircraft related defence 
matériel. This suggests that South Africa cannot completely rely on its industry to support 
its military needs hence it is important to have cordial arms control relationships with major 
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defence exporters particularly with leaders in the aircraft industry. For example in 2008 the 
DCAC issued 2 895 export permits for shipment to various countries worth R5.898 billion 
and these were mainly for evaluations, tests, demonstrations, repairs and R2.685 billion of 
this was to the USA. The total value of import permits in the same year was R6.361 billion 
and this ranged from complete systems, components and spare parts.  
 
South Africa, like most countries, has experienced severe defence budget cuts due to 
demilitarisation in the post-apartheid era and also general international trends. For example 
in 1996 (post-apartheid era) the budget had reduced to R5.99 billion compared to R11.89 
billion in 1989 (apartheid era). The ratio of the procurement contribution (in relation to the 
personnel and operating costs) to the total defence budget had reduced from 58.5% to 
18.1% which reflected the cancellation and postponement of a number of armaments 
projects (Batchelor and Dunne, 1998). This has affected the military expenditure of the 
country which although it is seen to be increasing from previous years but in real terms it is 
shrinking if it is compared to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as shown in Table 1. In 
1988 the percentage of military expenditure to the GDP was 4.3 compared to 2007 when it 
has reduced to 1.4. The huge gap can be attributed mostly to the difference between the 
apartheid era and post-apartheid era.  
 
Table 5.1: Defence budgets of South Africa and its contribution to GDP for various 
years. 
Year 
Defence Budget  
x million 
% Procurement %  GDP 
19891 11 435 58.5 4.1 
19961 5 9895 18.1 1.9 
20062 23 830 32.8 1.4 
20072 25 180 30.6 1.4 
20083 27 801  1.5 
 
1Sourced from African Security Review 1998, vol 7 (6) 
2Sourced from the National Treasury website and percentage procurement has been 
calculated using the Special Defence Account which is for special defence and purchases 
after subtracting the transfer payment to Armscor. 
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3The Special Defence Account was not reflected in the budget. 
 
The bulk of the procurement for the SANDF for the controlled military equipment is through 
Armscor except for the off-the shelf or commercially available items which are done by the 
SANDF procurement division.  
 
5.2.3 Analysis of import permits issued to Armscor 
 
The total value of import permits that were issued to Armscor from 2007 to 2009 are 
R3.778 billion, R4.889 billion, R4.505 billion respectively. The total number of import 
permits from 2007 to 2009 increased from 297, 431 and 505 respectively.  The imports are 
mainly from UK, Sweden, Germany, France, Italy and Switzerland. These countries are all 
members of the Wassenaar Agreement and they report denials to any country to their 
member states and blacklisting by any of the member states implies that it is unlikely that it 
can be procured from other countries. Surprisingly the import permits do not reflect much 
importing from the US though it is considered one of the powerful exporters of defence 
matériel.    
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Table 5.2: Import permits issued to Armscor and the value of defence matériel procured 
through those permits from 2007 to 2009. 
Import Permits issued per country 01 March 2007 to 28 February 2008 
Country  No of permits Products Category Total Rand value 
Australia 4 Parts and components C 3 793 750.00 
Belgium 1 Component of a 
system A 29 953 800.00 
France 7 Equipment, 
components C & A 25 703 837.00 
Germany  4 Equipment, Spares B, C, A 1 921 337 384.00 
Italy 64 Components , Parts, 
spares A, C, G 165 735 619.00 
Sweden 5 System, components, parts A, C 711 105 448.00 
Ukraine 1 Components A 42 000.00 
United 
Kingdom 207 
Components, parts, 
spares 
A, B, C, 
D 914 205 104.00 
USA 4 Parts, Components C 6 851 111.00 
 297    
Total 3 778 728 053.00 
Belgium 2 Parts and Components C 2 877 426.00 
France 20 Parts, components,  A, C 71 583 610.00 
Germany 9 Weapon, components, parts B, C 51 912 019.00 
Italy  98 Weapons, Parts and Components A, C 74 735 505.00 
Sweden 97 Parts and Components A, C 4 532 378 747.00 
United 
Kingdom 202 
Weapons, Parts and 
Components A,B, C, D 154 927 939.00 
USA 3 Parts B, C G 873 072.00 
 431   4 889 288 318.00 
Import permits issued per country 01 March 2009 to 28 February 2010 
Canada 3 Hardware, software A, C, G 1 160 890.00 
France 29 Components, parts, 
spares A, C, D 105 685 390.00 
Germany 21 System, components, parts A, C, G 201 990 108.00 
Italy 89 Parts, components A, C 34 430 083.00 
Sweden 187 System, components, parts A, C, G 3 934 153 825.00 
Switzerland 24 Components, parts,  A, C 74 679 306.00 
United 
Kingdom 151 
Components, spares, 
parts 
B, C, D, 
G 153 369 226.00 
USA 1 Equipment D 31 518.00 
 505    
  51 
Total 4 505 500 346.00 
 
It can then be claimed that serious violations of the arms control systems of any of the 
countries highlighted earlier have a potential to deny Armscor defence matériel to the 
amount of R3 778 728 053 in 2006 which is about 48% of the Special Defence Budget.  
This would certainly have a crippling effect on the ability of Armscor to be acquisition 
agency of the SANDF.  
 
5.2.4 Likely violations 
 
One of the violations that are considered to be serious by countries that are party to 
agreements like the Wassenaar is related to honesty with regard to end-use which is also 
related to the retransfer of defence equipment to another country without prior approval of 
the supplier country. This is so due to the fact that this is one of the ways of channelling 
defence equipment to the embargoed countries. This is in fact the reason why Armscor 
together with Denel and Fuchs were blacklisted by the US as they illegally transferred 
defence technology during the 1980’s. Armscor was required to implement an internal arms 
control compliance programme to the satisfaction of the US so as to prevent diversion of 
defence technology to end-users not authorized by the US. Another example is the trial of 
the German-Iranian trader Molsen Vanaki who was arrested by German authorities for 
allegedly illegally brokered the transfer of dual-use equipment to Iran with application to 
nuclear weapons program (Albright and Walron, 2009). He had arranged the sale of dual-
use nuclear and military equipment from Russian, European, and American manufacturers 
to Iranian front companies located in the United Arab Emirates. The possibility of this 
violation occurring deliberately at Armscor is highly unlikely. In the disposal stage of 
redundant defence equipment there is still uncertainty with regard to guidelines for 
destruction (from the NCACC), but that is under attention. 
 
5.2.5 Summary  
  
The defence matériel for the SANDF is imported mainly from the UK, Sweden, France, Italy 
and Switzerland. Many of these systems would have US content and consequently it is 
important that Armscor respects its export controls. The value of the defence matériel that 
has been imported for the SANDF by Armscor from 2007 to 2009 was R3.778 billion, 
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R4.889 billion and R4.505 billion and it is therefore important that Armscor conducts its 
acquisition in a manner that respect the arms control of these countries.  
 
5.3 Assessment of arms control awareness 
 
An assessment of arms control awareness at Armscor was assessed by analyzing the audit 
reports that came from the auditing of a number of acquisition projects.  An audit is defined 
as the systematic, independent and documented process for obtaining audit evidence and 
evaluating it objectively to determine which agreed criteria are fulfilled (Karapetrovic and 
Willborn, 2002).  The Policy for the Control of Trade Conventional Arms, issued by the 
National Conventional Arms Control Committee in terms of the National Conventional Arms 
Control Act (Act 41 of 2002), states that entities trading in conventional arms should 
implement self-regulatory compliance programmes to comply with national legislation, 
policy, processes and procedures. The requirement is that the holders of a valid ADM 
permit shall on request from a Competent Authority present to that authority, for inspection 
and assessment the entities’ policies and procedures implemented to ensure compliance 
with the requirements of the Act in the following categories: 
• The company policy 
• Internal processes and procedures 
• Individual responsibility 
• Education and training. 
Although ACD will be the focal point is such an audit especially with regard to company 
policy, it is important that all the other audit categories are complied with at project level, 
where the responsibility with regard to the involved defence material lie and if the approach 
of arms control from cradle to grave is applied. Thus the ACD ensures that in all projects 
that have controlled arms content have proper record keeping to ensure that basic 
information on all trade in conventional arms is retained and to provide proof of compliance 
with the Act, regulations and conditions of permits. The relevant documents particularly at 
Armscor would be end-user certificates, delivery verification, import and export permits. 
Thus the arms control compliance questionnaire (audit form) at Armscor focuses on the 
company arms control compliance profile (specifically to capture the profile of contractors of 
Armscor), EUCs, export permits and import permits (refer to Appendix D). Each of the 
above categories has probing questions which indicate the knowledge of the auditee about 
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handling of controlled defence matériel. The audit reports span about 16 audits that were 
conducted to Armscor project Mangers mainly from the Armscor cardinal projects from the 
23 March 2006 to January 2009 and these are summarised in Table 5.3. 
 
Audits are conducted by Arms Control Division to check if proper arms control procedures 
and regulations are adhered to. The division uses an arms control compliance 
questionnaire (refer Appendix C) to check if: 
• systems are in place to support  arms control compliance requirements 
• proper procedures are followed with regard to end-user certificates, import and export 
permits 
• records are kept and can be provided when needed 
 
Thus audit reports should to a very large extent reflect the arms control awareness of the 
auditees. The ACD has a responsibility that arms control regulations are adhered to by 
project managers/project officers in their acquisition projects and also by the contractors 
and audits should cover all those who are involved.  
 
5.3.1 Audit reports 
Audits have only been conducted since 2006 and have been on few selected cardinal 
programs (refer to Table 5.3) which are considered to highly sensitive to arms control 
issues.   Most of these have a substantial foreign content and therefore arms control will 
have a major impact on them. Only 16 projects have been audited while no contractors 
have been audited thus far.  
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Table 5.3: List of arms control audits conducted by ACD from 2006 to 2010 
Date of 
Audit Project/Contractor 
Nature of 
business Audit Findings/comments 
23/3 2006 Weapons system  No findings 
29/3/ 2006 Weapons System 
Procurement of 
weapons 
systems for 
SAN, SA Air 
Force and 
special forces 
No proper system for the storing of 
Arms Control Compliance records. 
Problem with attendance of courses. 
Overall impression good. 
No non-conformances were found. 
29/3/2006 Weapons system  
No proper system for the storing of 
Arms Control Compliance Records. 
No refresher courses or training 
Must still submit proof that all 
controlled items have been delivered. 
Must make receiving personnel 
aware that the items are controlled. 
Overall impression was good. 
No non-conformances were found. 
20/3/2008 Alkantpan Ballistic 
evaluation 
Could not supply proof that the 
original EUC has been handed to the 
client. 
Alkantpan requested training on arms 
control issues. 
 
3/3/2008 Naval systems/ Sitron program 
Corvette 
program has 
substantial 
foreign content 
Armscor does not have a mandate to 
audit the Navy 
10/3/2008 Alkantpan  
No findings with respect to the 
ballistic evaluation, establishing of 
disposal methods of high explosives 
and related materials. 
3/11/ 2008 Augusta  
Processes are in place to handle 
Aircraft on the Ground (AOGs) and 
urgent situations. 
No findings were made with respect 
to the handling of EUCs or Permits 
3/11/2008 Gripen 
Gripen is 
imported from 
Sweden and has 
substantial 
foreign  content 
and therefore 
legislation has a 
major impact on 
the program 
Audit forms (EUC and Import permit) 
not filled completely. 
Close cooperation between JAPO 
and ACD recommended for better 
communication and understanding if 
mutual and specific problems arise. 
Improved electronic monitoring and 
control of documents. 
No findings on EUCs and Permits. 
3/11/2008 Hawk  There must be further audits during 2009/2010 for physical inspection. 
16/3/2009 Assegai program   
    
14/9/2009 Aeronotics and Naval Logistics 
Armscor 
responsible for 
the handling of 
No end-use certificates have been 
handled by ACD to date of audit. 
Execujet needs to be audited. 
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In 2006 three audits were done on three different projects in the Weapons divisions. Some 
shortcomings were noted and these include lack of proper storing of arms control 
compliance records, lack of attendance of refresher courses and failure to provide proof 
that all controlled items were received. There seems to be an expectation from project 
managers that they do not have to keep records as these are kept by ACD and various 
other divisions like Armscor Business Logistics (ABL) and this will lead to just duplication of 
paper work. Proving that the controlled items is one of the tools that is used by most 
countries to ensure that the items imported from them are not diverted to embargoed 
the contractual 
and financial 
management of 
contracts. All 
procurement 
actions are done 
by the SA Air 
Force to 
Execujet 
Personnel at Aeronotcs and Naval 
Logistics must undergo training. 
14/9/2009 Gripen 
Chief Contracts 
Officer will be 
responsible for 
the handling of 
the Gripen repair 
orders for the 
DoD from the 
relevant OEM 
and suppliers. 
Arms control issues will be handled 
the same as the HAWK which 
efficient systems. 
14/9/2009 HAWK 
Chief contract 
Officer will be 
responsible for 
the handling of 
the Kawk repair 
orders for the 
DoD from the 
relevant OEM 
and suppliers 
No findings were made. 
15/9/2009 LYNX  No findings with respect to EUCs and permits 
18/11/2009 Alkantpan 
Ballistic 
evaluation and 
establishing of 
disposal of 1000 
kg bombs and 
related materials 
No findings although recommended 
that when specific sensitive goods 
e.g. cluster ammunition be audited 
when handled by Alkantpan. 
22/1/2010 Landward systems  
Personnel need to attend training. 
Proof could not be provided that the 
EUC has been forwarded to the 
OEM. 
Administration and tracking control 
must be optimized. 
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countries hence it is very important element of an arms control. Although the final 
assessment of the audit was “no findings” the report reflects serious shortcomings. 
 
No audits were done in 2007. 
 
In 2008 and 2009 a number of projects and divisions were audited. Most of these audits 
were on acquisition projects of aircrafts and processes were found to be in place to handle 
the aircraft on the ground (AOG) other urgent applications. In addition it was found that in 
some of the projects the electronic monitoring and control of documents have improved. 
However it was note that in some of the projects no proof was supplied that the original 
end-user certificate was handed over to the client. Suppliers are very serious with regard to 
end-user certificates as it verifies the end-user and what the item will be used for. Although 
the suppliers do not send the shipment without the end-user certificate it is important that 
the project managers provide evidence that the supplier received it. It was also noted that 
some of the questions in the questionnaire were not completed.  
 
One audit was conducted in Jan 2010 and the following were noted:  
• proof could not be provided that the EUC has been forwarded to the Original 
Equipment Manufacturer (OEM). The serious of this issue is as described earlier. 
• administration and tracking of documents must be optimized 
• personnel need training 
 
Although the audit reports showed improvement from in 2008/2009 compared to 2006 it 
was noted in the 2010 audit that the project managers are still not aware of their 
responsibilities with regard to end-user certificates, providing evidence that indeed the 
supplier received the end-user certificate. It can be concluded that for those projects that 
were audited there is generally a sound awareness of arms control issues but it is not at a 
desired level such that we can be confident that Armscor is respecting the arms control 
requirements of our foreign suppliers.  Moreover the audits have covered only few projects 
(there are about forty cardinal projects) and the contractors have not been audited and 
these audits cannot be assumed to give a true picture of arm control awareness at Armscor 
and its contractors. The ACD has been conducting training twice a year and since the 
contractors are scattered over the country it is difficult to make sure that they attend training 
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regularly.  A holistic plan is being developed by ACD to look at all projects and contractors 
and prioritize them according to their sensitivity to arms control and determine the 
frequency of audits.  
 .  
While we have based our discussion on these audit reports it is important to note that 
audits do fail, implying that it does not do what it is supposed to (Karapetrovic and Willborn, 
2000). This could be due to, at individual level, on: 
• Errors in the audit planning stages 
• Use of unqualified or incompetent auditors to conduct the audits 
• Absence of opening and closing meetings 
• Inadequate and improper use of sampling methods and other audit methodologies 
when collecting evidence 
• Lack of sufficient amount of audit evidence 
• Deficient or missing verification evidence/biased evaluation of audit evidence 
against audit criteria 
• Inconsistencies in audit findings 
• Acceptance of non-compliant or ineffective management system in registration 
audits 
• Subjective, biased or undue-influenced audit report. 
 
And at the program level: 
• Audit objectives do not reflect the underlying policy 
• Audit errors are undetected 
• Audits are declared feasible when actually they are not.  
 
Many of the problems that can be operational at an individual are not considered to be 
problematic as arms control auditors at Armscor have been formerly trained and therefore 
follow the necessary procedures when conducting audits and will be able avoid bias. The 
audit questionnaires also reflect the requirements of the Policy for the Control of Trade 
Conventional Arms, issued by the National Conventional Arms Control Committee. It is also 
important to note one of the drawbacks of audits is the problem of alleviating the problem of 
external imposition of judgement and consequent lack of auditee motivation to follow-up on 
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it (Karapetrovic and Willborn, 2002). This is not expected to play a bigger role as the 
auditor is also from Armscor.  
 
5.3.2 Summary 
No serious findings were reported from the audits although there were gaps identified with 
regard to keeping of records and making sure that EUCs reach the suppliers. This suggests 
the awareness is not at a required level or there is lack of commitment from the project 
managers.  
  
5.4 Leadership 
5.4.1 Analysis of results 
 
Out of 20 questionnaires that were sent through to the respondents, 17 were returned (85% 
response rate).  
The respondents included project managers from cardinal programs, management of ACD, 
DCAC, ABL and some contractors. The respondents rated themselves with only two cases 
where the manager was rated by personnel that report to him/her. The internal consistency 
of the respondents was checked by comparing the scores for the questions 2 and 6, 1 and 
33, 11 and 15 and finally 24 and 32 as this questions can be referred to as alternative 
forms of each other (Saunders et al., 2003; 310). The scores compared well for most of the 
respondents but there were few that compared poorly and these included the scores of the 
raters (Appendix F). Although the correlation factor were calculated for the scores this 
statistical approach did not prove to be appropriate as in one of the calculations it was not 
possible to get the correlation factor due to division by zero and some had low correlation 
factors though it seems there scores were very close to each other. 
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Table 5.4: Scores of questionnaires from the respondents 
Res. No Gender Liaison Role Troubleshooter Conflict Manager Coach Total Score % Score
1 M 27 29 32 28 116 73
2 F 32 32 31 29 124 78
3 F 32 29 28 30 119 74
4 M 32 30 28 26 116 73
5 M 33 29 31 29 122 76
6 F 20 12 12 28 72 45
7 F 37 33 30 36 136 85
8 M 33 28 30 27 118 74
9 M 30 31 34 30 125 78
10 M 35 29 30 28 122 76
11 M 40 37 35 28 140 88
12 M 31 32 28 31 122 76
13 M 33 34 33 34 134 84
14 M 30 25 30 23 108 68
15 F 36 36 28 29 129 81
16 M 33 24 27 27 111 69
17 M 28 35 33 30 126 79
80 74 74 73 120 75
 
 
The respondents generally scored well in all the specific roles of leadership and that was 
also supported by the scores of the subordinates (rater) except in one case where the rater 
seemed to be unsure as shown by the total score of 45. This seems to suggest that there is 
a leadership behaviour in the arms control environment that facilitate the awareness and 
implementation of arms control issues. The interest in leadership in this study is mainly on 
the leader as a liaison with external constituencies particularly with Armscor Project 
Managers. Leaders must provide relevant information to their teams and organise forums 
where arms control issues are discussed. It is pleasing that the respondents scored the 
best marks in this role as reflected by the average percentage score of 80. It is also thought 
that the role of leaders as trouble-shooters is also very important particularly with DCAC, 
ACD and AB Logistics as they have to frequently try to solve arms control problems 
particularly from industry, contractors and Armscor Project managers that relate to delays 
and issuing of permits. The scores ranged from 29 to 37 from DCAC and ACD which 
suggest a positive attitude to troubleshooting. 
 
These results must be treated with caution though as the questionnaire did not cover all the 
departments/divisions/ that are considered to be role players in arms control i.e. customs 
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and AB Logistics. There is also the possibility that the respondents may have rated 
themselves highly. 
 
5.4.2 Summary  
 
The results suggest that leadership at ACD, DCAC, Armscor Project Managers, contractors 
and DOD act as liaison with external constituencies so that they can provide relevant 
information to their teams, and also organise forums where issues are discussed with 
clients or their customers. Although the questionnaire did not refer explicitly to arms control, 
it is argued that arms control is one of the issues that the leaders would seek information 
for the benefit of their teams.  
  
5.5 Alignment of role-players 
 
The role-players in the acquisition of controlled defence matériel are considered to be 
Armscor Arms Control Division (ACD), Armscor Business Logistics (ABL), Directorate 
Conventional Arms Control (DCAC), Customs and the End-User. Thus interviews were held 
with senior personnel of all the role players.  
 
Table 5.5: List of the interviewees and their organisation/department /division.   
Department/Division Interviewee 
ACD Manager: Arms Control Compliance 
DCAC Acting Director of DCAC 
ABL Senior Manger: ABL 
Customs Branch Manager SARS Customs Kempton Park 
SANDF (End-user) Deputy Director:  Arms Control Policy 
 
Without giving detail of each interview, the results are summarized below and have 
been grouped to establish if there are well defined turnaround times with regard to the 
service to the customers, appropriate human resources, proper IT system to support 
arms control, information sharing /exchange, speciality skills that could benefit other 
role- players and any barriers to the effective running of the arms control system. 
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5.5.1 Service to customers 
 
Generally all the role-players have well defined turnaround pledges although this can be 
affected by circumstances beyond their control. For example the applications that are 
submitted to ACD are guaranteed to be processed and forwarded to DCAC within 24 hours 
only if it is complete and correct otherwise it is sent back to the applicant.  DCAC promises 
to process the temporary permits within 5 working days but it can be less or more 
depending on volumes and capacity. Other permits like contracting permits take about 
three weeks as they have to undergo review process that involves departments like DTI, 
SAPS, NIA etc. Customs promises to process the declaration within 2 hours if it from the 
accredited client like ABL. They rate their clients and the accredited clients are considered 
trustworthy and have accounts with customs. 
 
5.5.2 Human resources/capacity 
 
All the role-players indicated that they have sufficient personnel to deal with their workload 
except DCAC where there are serious capacity problems. Customs indicated they had 
capacity problems but when they adopted a partially paperless electronic system they are 
coping well with volumes of declarations.  DCAC is still operating with same capacity of 
1995 when there were about 120-150 applications as compared to now when they have to 
process about 1000 applications. Proposals have submitted to the NCACC to address 
capacity but this has not been addressed for a very long time. DCAC reports to the NCACC 
but it is supported by DOD with office space and salaries. There is a belief that if the 
NCACC could be separate entity with its own budget and personnel then it could be in a 
better position to address capacity problems. 
 
5.5.3 Information sharing/exchange 
 
Information sharing seems to be mainly between role-players that have an interface with 
regard to the acquisition process which is mainly to make sure there is flow of necessary 
documents between those role players. There is mutual exchange of information between 
the end-user (DOD:Arms Control Policy), the ACD and DCAC more on technical issues 
regarding the interpretation of regulations. As these role-players are housed in the same 
building, there are regular discussions/consultations which are to their benefit. Information 
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sharing from DOD is limited by security concerns especially with accessing certain 
databases. Recently a discussion session was held between ACD, ABL and certain 
Armscor project Managers where issues relating to shipping discussed. There is also a 
strong interaction between customs and ABL (accredited client of customs). Notably there 
seems to be no interaction and information sharing between ACD and customs probably 
due to the fact that they do not directly feed to each other with regard to acquisition. 
Cooperation between the two parties could benefit them especially with requirements of 
proof of delivery of controlled defence matériel and fine-tuning of issues regarding the pink 
forms.  
 
In addition some of the role-players regularly share information in their specific 
environment. For example ACD interacts with AMD (industry support organisation), Denel, 
ATE and overseas partners like the US Department of State and Department of 
Commerce. DCAC used to have workshops where industry (including Armscor) were 
invited to share ideas and problems and would also visit companies. That is no longer 
taking place due to capacity problems but they regularly discuss problems with customs. 
  
End-User 
(SANDF) 
DCAC 
ACD ABL 
Customs 
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Figure 5.1: Interactions between the various role-players for procurement of defence 
materiel at Armscor.  
  
Although there is interaction between ACD and DCAC as they are both located in the same 
building ACD also interacts with other defence entities like Denel, AMD, ATE and overseas 
partners like the US Department of State and the Department of Commerce.    
 
5.5.4 IT support system 
 
IT plays a critical role as a supportive tool in alliances especially with regard transmission 
and storage of information and in monitoring activities. At ACD there is currently a gap with 
regard to the monitoring and tracking of applications for permits so that warning signals can 
be triggered when applications are delayed or if there are outstanding documents. Such a 
system is currently under development with the assistance of Armscor IT division and an 
outside contractor and it is expected to be up and running by July 2010. DCAC has a 
system that was developed by SITA some years back and the strategy is to enhance the 
current system through SITA and that normally takes time. Personnel do not have internet 
and emails in their offices and have a centralised internet terminal where they can 
download their email. This is suggested to be due to security reasons. The internet terminal 
is supported but the DOD has not been working for a very long time. It can be suggested 
that DCAC does not have a very supportive IT division. 
 
Customs has a partially paperless electronic system that is use for declaration with their 
accredited clients. These clients would submit their declaration and it is processed within 
two hours but they still have to submit hard copies of their supporting documentation 
thereafter. Customs encourages their clients to contact their IT department so that they 
could be linked with their systems and be able to access certain relevant information.    
 
Ideally it is desirable to have an integrated IT system that will involve all the role players so 
that they could track progress of permit application and can verify the permits issued 
whenever a shipment is imported or exported. This could help avoid delays that are 
common when some of the permits are lost and if there was an electronic system one 
would be able to check or verify that the permit was issued. That system could be driven by 
DCAC but due to the fact that NCACC does not have its own budget and does have its 
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dedicated IT support division this probability that this could be implemented is very much 
remote. 
 
5.5.5 Specialty skills  
 
It came out from the interviews that some of the items in munitions list and dual-use are 
very complex and require people with high technical knowledge to interpret them correctly. 
An example is “.. 
ACD and the end-user (DOD Arms Control Policy) have technical expertise (or have 
access to individuals that have specialist knowledge) that is required to interpret the 
regulations and can contribute to international forums that look at reviewing some the 
treaties like the Wassenaar Agreement. Some of the interviewees believe that individuals 
with specialist knowledge must be identified from academic institutions, research institutes 
like CSIR and industry who would be consulted for specific inputs and may be required to 
participate in discussion I high level forums as in the Wassenaar agreement. It is noted that 
this is the approach of countries like the US as the try to influence discussions so that their 
defence industries are not disadvantaged by the resolutions taken. It is noted that some of 
the transgressors of arms control regulations use the complexities of certain clauses to 
circumvent controls as was the case with Dr Guenter Welzien, a consultant who helped 
various firms in Germany to navigate export controls process in many creative ways 
(Albright et al, 2002). People with specialist technical knowledge will be able to identify 
such problems. 
 
5.5.6 Barriers to arms control 
 
Issues mentioned include lack of capacity, unclear guidelines on how decisions are made 
by some role players, ambiguous interpretations of the regulations, other enforcers of the 
relevant legislations are not effective and lack of technical expertise.   The issue of 
ambiguous interpretations of regulations and lack of technical expertise are related in that 
the improving the latter can help in limiting the former. The issue of certain enforcers of 
relevant legislations surface not only from the interviews but also from some of the 
discussion between ACD and ABL. It came out that there would be instances when the 
shipment will be detained because of lack of proper permits but the client would come back 
within few days with the required permit when the normal process of acquiring that permit 
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would have been longer. This came up in the discussion between ACD and ABL when 
certain clients would approach ABL to arrange shipment without the necessary permits but 
when the request is denied they would approach other shipping agents and with goods 
finally delivered.   
 
The chain is as strong as its weakest link. Capacity problems at DCAC will always affect 
delivery at ACD 
 
5.5.7 Summary   
 
It has been established that there is a lack of alignment and systematic coordination of the 
activities of the role players. There are formal forums where strategic issues are discussed 
with regard to arms control. Although some of the role players were found to be effective in 
fulfilling their obligations in the procurement value chain, there were serious gaps in some 
of them that may be limiting their capabilities to serve their customers. Critical in the 
acquisition chain is the issuing of permits by DCAC and the lack of capacity in that 
organisation to issue these within minimum turnaround times seems to be central in many 
problems around arm control. The lack of an integrated IT system to monitor EUCs and 
permits is limiting to all the role players. 
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   CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The review of the NCACC policy and regulations has shown these to be reflective of the 
WA mandate but there were areas that were not sufficiently addressed. No much attention 
was given to the control of arms control brokers given their reported implications in 
proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons which are commonly used in Africa to 
violate human rights. The dual-use goods and technology control lists is not very clear in 
classification of sensitive and very sensitive items. Some of the clauses may be very 
complex to be understood by compliance officers that without specialist or technical 
expertise. Although the arms control policy provides for the issuing of open permits, the 
DCAC is reluctant to issue these and this affects the capability of industry to attend to very 
urgent orders.  
 
The value of the defence matériel that has been imported for the SANDF by Armscor from 
2007 to 2009 was R3.778 billion, R4.889 billion and R4.505 billion and these were mainly 
from the UK, Sweden, France, Italy and Switzerland. This is considered to be quite 
substantial procurement and thus it is important that Armscor respect the export controls of 
these countries and avoid being blacklisted by anyone of them. 
 
Although audit reports from 2006 to 2009 show that considerable progress has been made 
in improving arms control awareness at Armscor, it is clear that it is not yet at an optimum 
level or there is a lack of commitment from the project managers to comply with arms 
control regulations. To some extent both these factors play a role. 
 
The responses from the questionnaires indicate that leadership at ACD, DCAC, APM, 
contractors and DOD play their role as team leaders in their environments. Particularly they 
provide relevant information to their teams for them to perform their duties and organise 
forums where issues /problems are discussed with clients/customers and other 
stakeholders.  
 
Although some of the role players were found to be effective in fulfilling their obligations in 
the procurement value chain, there were serious gaps in some of them that may be limiting 
their capabilities to serve their customers. Critical in the acquisition chain is the issuing of 
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permits by DCAC and the lack of capacity in that organisation to issue these within 
minimum turnaround times seems to be central in many problems around arm control. The 
lack of an integrated IT system to monitor EUCs and permits is limiting to all the role 
players. 
 
Thus it is concluded that arms control system needs attention with regard to improving the 
NCACC policies and regulations to close all loopholes with regard to SALW and allow 
faster trade for the defence industry, and equip the role players with resources to perform.  
 
Although some of the issues highlighted above are beyond control of Armscor, it is believed 
that through their involvement in many of the review committees for WA, DOD and DCAC it 
is in better position to articulate and pronounce on many of these issues steering the arms 
control towards the right direction. Thus the following are recommended:  
• Investigate the possibility and impact of issuing open permits. This must not be 
done haphazardly but the defence industry could be segmented into accredited and 
non-accredited companies and open permits be issued to accredited companies 
only. Then the accredited companies will be required to report on activities perhaps 
after ix months done under those open permits. The accreditation may be based 
trust developed between that company and DCAC which may be related to having 
a proper compliance office or arms control compliance officer and elaborate 
compliance and many other requirements that may be relevant.  More intense 
review be done on classification of dual-list items to avoid confusion on whether 
items are controlled or not.  
• More arms control compliance audits should be done for each year so that all the 
cardinal programs and the contractors are audited at least once in two years. This 
would ensure that projects are kept aware of arms control issues and problems are 
detected earlier rather.   
• NCACC/DCAC should operate as a complete separate entity with its own budget 
so that it can address its needs. The possibility of integrating the NPC and NCACC 
be investigated so as to rationalize resources and technical expertise. An 
integrated IT system for ACD, DCAC, Customs, ABL should be implemented so 
that permit could be monitored and verified any time.  
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     Chapter 7 
       LEARNING AND REFLECTION 
 
Embarking on this research was a really rewarding exercise both academically and career-
wise. The research module for the MBA at UNISA SBL spans the three years and it has 
been a journey that has been characterized by excitement of discovering new tools to solve 
management problems, meeting different people with fascinating characters, 
disappointment in some of cases of not living up to the expectations of the course and at 
sometimes at SBL administration and pressure from the workload. 
 
A number of things were learnt while conducting the interviews for the project. This was an 
opportunity to experience some of the problem that are cited in literature when conducting 
interview. The challenge of controlling the interview particularly when the interviewee is 
very passionate about the subject was problematic. This is challenging especially when you 
deal with senior people that you would not like to offend by cutting the interview short.  
 
As I have joined the arms control division last year, I chose the project particularly on arms 
control to help me to understand the environment faster. I believe this was a good decision 
as I was forced to read extensively on the subject and established a good relationship with 
my colleagues. . The interviews that I conducted helped me to understand the roles of the 
different agencies and establish contacts with a number of people in arms control who will 
be of help in the future as one actually tries to solve problems in my work environment. .  
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Appendix A 
 
Brainstorming 
 
Attitude, treaties/agreements, grey areas in control list, staffing problems at DCAC, 
turnaround times for permits, unclear foreign policy in NCAC, terrorism, transparency, 
accountability, resources, ignorance, politics, time, personnel, funds, end-user certificate 
requirement, shipping problems, customs, government policy, Armscor contractors, 
amendment of end-user certificates, integrated licence system, transfer of military 
equipment, job losses, deadlines for projects at Armscor, leadership, small military items 
(nuts and bolts), arms control awareness, repair of military equipment, illegal arms trade, 
penalties, Armscor/Department of Defence/ Industry arms control structure (alignment), 
ITAR list, resistance to change, integrated systems (military equipment), exports, 
government subsidies on exports, Wassenaar Arrangement, different import requirements, 
UN embargoes,  recession,  alignment and co-ordination, disposal of military equipment, 
shipping agencies (AB logistics and industry), culture, lack of monitoring, registration with 
DCAC, risk. 
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Appendix B 
Mind-mapping of brainstorming 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Repairs/maintena
nce, transfer, 
import, export of 
military 
equipment, small 
military items 
(nuts/bolts), 
disposal 
Permits, end-user 
certificates/amend
ments, integrated 
licence system, 
monitoring 
compliance, illegal 
trade 
Control list, 
foreign policy, 
politics, treaties, 
dual use list, ITAR 
list, government 
policy,  UN 
embargoes  
DCAC, NCAC, 
Armscor- Arms 
control, 
contractors, 
alignment, 
resources, 
shipping agents, 
customs 
Attitude, 
ignorance, 
accountability, 
transparency, 
awareness,  
Arms control 
(Issues) 
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APPENDIX C 
Division
TS S X Con  Restr
YES NO
 
 
 
 
  
       
Follow-up ACC Audit
 
Foreign Involvement  
Country
 
Is an Arms Control Compliance Policy in place from Management down to lower levels?
Do you have a compliance program regarding Arms Control?
 
 
 
Company
Type of involvement with this audit:  
Projects/Orders
Fax Code
 
Web
 Fax Number
Security clearance
 
Do employees involved with armaments related products regularly attend refresher courses?
Classification of this 
project, order/s and 
subcontractor/s
Subcontractors
 
Do you have a process for applying for EUCs?
ARMS Control Compliance Company Profile 
Classification of contracts
 
 
  
 
 
 
Cell
E-mail
 Tel Number
Nature of Bussiness
Contact person 
 
 
AUDITEE PROFILE
Telephone Code Telephone No.
 
Postal Address
ARMSCOR ARMS CONTROL DIVISION
ARMS CONTROL COMPLIANCE QUESTIONNAIRE
 
Date Of Next Visit
 
                                                                AUDIT INFORMATION 
Purpose of next Visit
Fax Code
 
Tel Code
 
Fax number
Surname  Initials
 
Designation
Do you have a compliance officer responsible for compliance matters?
Have all staff members involved in the transfer of armament related products been trained in all aspects of 
regulatory processes of Arms Control Compliance? 
Do you have a process for applying for Import Permits?
Do you have a process for applying for Export Permits?
Do you have a process for storing and retrieving of the relevant records?
Physical Address
 
Company Name
Evaluation Date
COMPANY INFORMATION
 
ACC TrainingInvestigations
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Yes No
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Can items be physically inspected?
ITEMS AUDITED
List of items delivered in 7 to be supplied.  (To be compared with EUC list )
Are policies and procedures in place in order to handle controlled items?
Are items handled as controlled items in accordance with policies and procedures?
Provide proof of delivery of items (if already delivered)
Provide proof of requirement for items on EUC
Can copy of EUCs and all other relevant documentation be fully retrieved?
Has EUC been forwarded to OEM? Provide proof.
 EUCs
Contact Person:                 
Telephone Number :                                 Date:                                  EUC No.: 
Company / Division :      
 General remarks:
 
 
YES NO
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 How do you link it with Import Permit when it is being returned?
  
General Remarks:
Permit Number:                                                                                                                 Permit Date:                                                    
EXPORT PERMITS
Items exported for demonstrations, evaluations, testing, repair, loan, shows, exhibitions, 
Can a copy of the Export Permit and other relevant documentation be fully retrieved?
Company / Division :                                                                                                                     Date:  
Provide proof that items arrived at the delivery address
Telephone Number :                                                                        
Contact Person :             
ITEMS AUDITED
Are procedures in place at recipient in order to handle controlled items?
Has the End User been informed that these items are Arms Control related?
Has the necessary Arms Control related documentation been delivered to the recipient?
Are the items handled as controlled items in accordance with procedures?
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 Date:
 
Date:
YES NO
1
2
3
4
5
6
 
Are items handled as controlled items in accordance with procedures?
Telephone Number :   
    
   
 
                                                                                                                      Date:    
IMPORT  PERMITS
Are procedures in place in order to handle controlled items?
Can items be traced?
Company / Division :    
ITEMS AUDITED
Can proof be provided that goods arrived at delivery address?
 
Armaments, Development, Manufacturing and or Services Permit No.
Contracting Permit No.
Can copy of Import Permit and other relevant documentation be fully retrieved?
 
 
General Remarks:
Contact Person :                 
Records i.r.o. return of items exported for demonstration, evaluations, testing, repair, loan, 
 
 
 
 
 
TS S  Con  Restr
 
AUDIT REPORT
 
Company Name
Physical Address
Postal Address
General Remarks: 
Nature of Bussiness  
Telephone Code Telephone No. Fax Code Fax number
Classification of contracts
   
Security clearance
Classification of this 
project, order/s and 
subcontractor/s
Projects/Orders Subcontractors
 
Foreign Involvement  
Company Country
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APPENDIX D 
Arms control structure - Alignment 
 
The value chain for the acquisition of controlled defence matériel is considered to include 
ACD, DCAC, AB Logistics, Supplier, Customs and the end-user. Thus the success (deliver 
within time and budget) acquisition depends on the alignment and co-ordination of the 
processes in the elements of the chain. The rationale is to look at the strengths and 
weaknesses of each stakeholder in the chain with a view of synergizing the strengths and 
mitigating the weaknesses. 
 
Armscor Arms Control Division   
 
ACD is responsible for checking of EUC and permit applications before submission to 
DCAC. It also plays an advisory role to project managers and is involved in troubleshooting 
with regard to arms control matters. Relevant questions are: 
 
1. Is there any value added to the applications for EUCs and permits that are submitted to 
ACD rather than directly to DCAC? 
2. What is the transit period for applications of permit and EUCs en route to DCAC? 
3. Is there enough capacity (personnel, resources) to deal effectively with the roles and 
responsibilities of ACD (application for EUC, advisory role, troubleshooting)? 
4. How effective is the troubleshooting? What are the challenges? Are there clear policies 
and procedures?  What is the success rate? 
5. Are there IT systems in place for record keeping and tracking of applications? 
6. Is there organizational support with regard to design and implementation of effective IT 
systems? 
7. Is the mutual exchange of information and ideas with stakeholders with regard to ways to 
improve service to customers? 
8. What are the possibilities of having an integrated IT system that could link up all 
stakeholders such that they are able to retrieve EUC/permit information any time i.e. check 
progress of EUCs, verify permits for shipment etc.  
9. Who would be responsible for implementing and maintaining such a system?  
10. What do you think are the strongest barriers to the effective running of the arms 
compliance system? 
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11. Does your company/department /division possess any unique capabilities that could 
benefit other stakeholders involved in arms control?  
 
Directorate Conventional Arms Control (DCAC) 
 
DCAC processes the applications for EUC and permits, gives guidance with regard to 
blacklisted countries and applicable embargoes. Relevant questions are: 
 
1. What are the turnaround times for the EUC and permits? 
2. Do the applications submitted have the necessary information required to process? 
3. Are the special ways of handling urgent applications? 
4. Are there enough personnel for handling of applications? 
5. Are there effective IT systems for handling the applications and tracing of progress?  
6. Is there organizational support with regard to design and implementation of effective IT 
systems?  
7. Is the mutual exchange of information and ideas with stakeholders with regard to ways to 
improve service to customers? 
8. What are the possibilities of having an integrated IT system that could link up all 
stakeholders such that they are able to retrieve EUC/permit information any time i.e. check 
progress of EUCs, verify permits for shipment etc. 
9. Who would be responsible for implementing and maintaining such a system? 
10. What do you think are the strongest barriers to the effective running of the arms 
compliance system? 
11. Does your company/department/division possess any unique capabilities that could 
benefit other stakeholders involved in arms control?  
 
Armscor Business Logistics (ABL) 
 
ABL does the arrangements for shipping of defence equipment and interacts with project 
managers and customs and also suppliers. 
 
1. How long does it take to process requests?  
2. Is the necessary documentation required to process the application always attached to 
the requests? 
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3. Are there enough personnel to handle and process requests timeously? 
4. How available is shipping (air, ground and sea)? What are the challenges with transport 
routes? 
5. Are there effective IT systems for handling and tracking of the deliveries? 
6. Is there organizational support with regard to design and implementation of effective IT 
systems? 
7. Is the mutual exchange of information and ideas with stakeholders with regard to ways 
to improve service to customers especially with customs? 
8. What are the possibilities of having an integrated IT system that could link up all 
stakeholders such that they are able to retrieve EUC/permit information any time i.e. check 
progress of EUCs, verify permits for shipment etc. 
9. Who would be responsible for implementing and maintaining such a system? 
10. What do you think are the strongest barriers to the effective running of the arms 
compliance system? 
11.  Does your company/department /division possess any unique capabilities that could 
benefit other stakeholders involved in arms control?   
 
 
Customs 
 
Gateway to the country for orders 
 
1. What is the transit period from customs to the end-user? 
2. Is there a special way to handle controlled defence matériel? 
3. Is there enough personnel to receive and dispatch the items to the end-user? 
4. Is there enough and safe storage for controlled items? 
5. Are there IT systems in place to trace end-user certificates and verify permits? 
6. Is there organizational support with regard to design and implementation of effective IT 
systems? 
7. Is there mutual exchange of information and ideas with stakeholders with regard to 
ways to improve service to customers especially with customs? 
8. What are the possibilities of having an integrated IT system that could link up all 
stakeholders such that they are able to retrieve EUC/permit information any time i.e. check 
progress of EUCs, verify permits for shipment etc. 
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9. Who would be responsible for implementing and maintaining such a system? 
10. What do you think are the strongest barriers to the effective running of the arms 
compliance system? 
11. Does your company/department /division possess any unique capabilities that could 
benefit other stakeholders involved in arms control?   
 
End-user (The SANDF) 
 
1. Is there a system to track the location of controlled items in the SANDF? 
2. Is there any procurement of controlled items for the SANDF that is not done through 
Armscor? 
3. Is there organizational support with regard to design and implementation of effective IT 
systems? 
4. Is there mutual exchange of information and ideas with other stakeholders with regard 
to ways to improve service to customers especially with customs? 
5. What are the possibilities of having an integrated IT system that could link up all 
stakeholders such that they are able to retrieve EUC/permit information any time i.e. check 
progress of EUCs, verify permits for shipment etc. 
6. Who would be responsible for implementing and maintaining such a system? 
7. What do you think are the strongest barriers to the effective running of the arms 
compliance system? 
8. Does your company/department /division possess any unique capabilities that could 
benefit other stakeholders involved in arms control?   
9. (International) Partcipation of DoD in international committees of any of the international 
agreements like WA. 
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APPENDIX E 
   Team Leadership Questionnaire 
 
 Leader Form 
 
Name……………………………………………………....Date ………………………………………. 
Organisation………………………………………………Department/Division………………………. 
Position …………………………………………………...Sex…………………………………………. 
This questionnaire will be used to rate your team leadership. It consists of forty descriptive 
statements of leadership roles as a coach, troubleshooter, conflict manager and liaison with 
external constituencies. Please answer all questions by ticking the appropriate score and if the 
question is inapplicable to you or you are unable to answer it, please skip it.   
 
Please use the following rating scale 
 
Frequently, if not always = 4; Fairly often = 3; Sometimes = 2; Once in a while = 1; Not at all = 0 
 
1. I take interests of my team to higher authorities........................................................ 4 3 2 1 0 
2. I do not attend to problems until they become serious.............................................. 4 3 2 1 0 
3. I encourage them to talk freely about their problems................................................. 4 3 2 1 0 
4. I clarify expectations and roles to my team members............................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
5. I secure the needed resources for my team.............................................................. 4 3 2 1 0 
6. I try to solve problems immediately.......................................................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
7. I do not have time to deal with conflict...................................................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
8. I indicate clearly who is responsible for performing tasks................................ 4 3 2 1 0 
9. I provide relevant information to my team................................................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
10. I believe there is one best solution for a problem........................................................ 4 3 2 1 0 
11. I regard conflict as normal in a workplace................................................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
12. I leave it to my team members to distribute and share tasks...................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
13. I instil customer satisfaction to my team members..................................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
14. I do not solve problems for my team members but I facilitate the process................. 4 3 2 1 0 
15. I tolerate conflict and assist members to go through it................................................ 4 3 2 1 0 
16. I acknowledge good work to my team members......................................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
17. I organise forums where issues/problems are discussed with customers.............................4 3 2 1 0 
18. When solving problems, I ask penetrating questions................................................. 4 3 2 1 0 
19. I am likely to take disciplinary action for involvement in conflict.................................. 4 3 2 1 0 
20. I talk optimally about the future................................................................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
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21. The customers sometimes irritate me......................................................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
22. I look for differing perspectives when solving problems............................................. 4 3 2 1 0 
23. I try to find the best solution even though there will be disagreements...................... 4 3 2 1 0 
24. I spend time teaching and coaching........................................................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
25. I involve my team members when interacting with customers................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
26. I immediately take action on complaints and failures................................................. 4 3 2 1 0 
27. I avoid resolving conflicts if they are too complex...................................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
28. I encourage team members to learn by themselves.................................................. 4 3 2 1 0 
29. I wait for the customers to complain rather than looking for potential problems......... 4 3 2 1 0 
30. I encourage team members to look at problems from different perspectives............ 4 3 2 1 0 
31. I try to find the source of conflict whenever it arises.................................................. 4 3 2 1 0 
32. I am too busy to give support to my team members.................................................. 4 3 2 1 0 
33. I am effective in representing my team members to higher authority........................ 4 3 2 1 0 
34. I encourage members to solve their problems.......................................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
35. I consider the moral and ethical consequences of a decision................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
36. I help my team members to develop their strengths.................................................. 4 3 2 1 0 
37. I sometimes feel the time I spend to customers is not worth it.................................. 4 3 2 1 0 
38. I wait for problems to surface before taking actions................................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
39. I emphasize the importance of collective sense of mission........................................ 4 3 2 1 0 
40. I encourage members to do just what is enough to meet the expectations................ 4 3 2 1 0 
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Team Leadership Questionnaire 
 
 Rater Form 
 
Name……………………………………………………....Date ………………………………………. 
Organisation……………………………………………….Department/Division………………………. 
Position …………………………………………………....Sex…………………………………………. 
Name of Team Leader……………………………………………….................................................. 
 
This questionnaire will be used to measure team leadership of your leader/peer. It consist of forty descriptive 
statements of leadership roles as a coach, troubleshooter, conflict manager and liaison with external constituencies. 
Please answer all questions by ticking the appropriate score and if the question is inapplicable to you or you are unable 
to answer it, please skip it.   
 
Please use the following rating scale 
 
Frequently, if not always = 4;  Fairly often = 3; Sometimes = 2;  Once in a while = 1;  Not at all = 0 
 
My team leader that I am rating……. 
 
1. Take interests of our team to higher authorities................................................ 4 3 2 1 0 
2. Does not attend to problems until they become serious................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
3. Encourages us to talk freely about our problems............................................ 4 3 2 1 0 
4. Clarifies expectations and roles of the team members..................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
5. Secures the needed resources for our team.................................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
6. Attempts to solve problems immediately.......................................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
7. Does not have time to deal with conflict........................................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
8. Indicates clearly who is responsible for performing certain tasks..................... 4 3 2 1 0 
9. Provides relevant information to my team......................................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
10. Believes there is one best solution for a problem............................................. 4 3 2 1 0 
11. Regards conflict as normal in a workplace....................................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
12. Leaves it to us to distribute and share tasks.................................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
13. Instils customer satisfaction to the team members.......................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
14. Does not solve problems for us but facilitates the process.............................. 4 3 2 1 0 
15. Tolerates conflict and assist members to go through problem....................................4 3 2 1 0 
16. Acknowledges good work to the team members............................................. 4 3 2 1 0 
17. Organises forums where issues/problems are discussed with customers......................4 3 2 1 0 
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18. Asks penetrating questions when solving problems....................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
19. Is likely to take disciplinary action for involvement in conflict......................... 4 3 2 1 0 
20. Talks optimally about the future...................................................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
21. Sometimes gets irritated by customers........................................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
22. Looks for differing perspectives when solving problems................................. 4 3 2 1 0 
23. Attempts to find the best solution even though there are disagreements....... 4 3 2 1 0 
24. Spends time teaching and coaching............................................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
25. Involves the team members when interacting with customers....................... 4 3 2 1 0 
26. Immediately takes action on complaints and failures..................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
27. Avoids resolving conflicts if they are too complex.......................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
28. Encourages team members to learn by themselves...................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
29. Waits for the customers to complain rather than looking for potential problems 4 3 2 1 0 
30. Encourages team members to look at problems from different perspectives... 4 3 2 1 0 
31. Tries to find the source of conflict whenever it arises....................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
32. Is too busy to give support to the team members............................................. 4 3 2 1 0 
33. Is effective in representing us to higher authority............................................. 4 3 2 1 0 
34. Encourages team members to solve their problems........................................ 4 3 2 1 0 
35. Considers the moral and ethical consequences of a decision.......................... 4 3 2 1 0 
36. Helps team members to develop their strengths.............................................. 4 3 2 1 0 
37. Sometimes feels the time he/she spends to customers is not worth it............. 4 3 2 1 0 
38. Waits for problems to surface before taking actions......................................... 4 3 2 1 0 
39. Emphasizes the importance of collective sense of mission.............................. 4 3 2 1 0 
40. Encourages members to do just what is enough to meet the expectations...... 4 3 2 1 0 
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APPENDIX F 
 
No 1 No 2 No 3 No 4 No 5
2 4 4 4 0 3 4 3 1 3
3 3 1 4 4 4 4 3 4 3
4 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 4 4
2 2 3 4 3 4 2 2 4 3
0.454545 -0.13245 0.666667 1 0.333333
No 6 No 7 No 8 No 9 No 10
2 2 0 4 3 2 4 4 3 4
4 0 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 3
4 0 4 2 3 2 3 3 3 3
3 2 4 0 2 4 3 4 2 3
-0.90453 -0.68313 0 0.333333 0
No 11 No 12 No 13 No 14 No 15
4 4 1 4 4 4 0 4 2 4
4 4 4 4 2 3 4 4 1
3 4 2 2 3 1 1 0
4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4
#DIV/0! 0.13484 0.365148
No 16 No 17
1 4 4 4
4 4 3 2
2 2 3 3
3 3 3 2
0.13484 0.870388
 
 
